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Comment
Rights of Unwed Fathers and the Best Interests of
the Child: Can These Competing Interests be
Harmonized? Illinois' Putative Father
Registry Provides an Answer
If . . . the best interests of the child is to be the determining
factor in child custody cases, persons seeking babies to adopt
might profitably frequent grocery stores and snatch babies from
carts when the parent is looking the other way. Then, if custody
proceedings can be delayed long enough, they can assert that
they have a nicer home, a superior education, a better job or
whatever, and that the best interests of the child are with the
baby snatchers. Children of parents living in public housing or
other conditions deemed less than affluent and children with
single parents might be considered particularly fair game. The
law, thankfully, is otherwise.'
We must remember that the purpose of an adoption is to provide
a home for a child, not a child for a home.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Emotions run high in contested adoptions. Parties with different
and competing interests vie for the most favorable position in pro-
ceedings determining who will receive parental rights over the child,
what is best for the child, and how the law applies in any given
situation.3 These parties can include the child, the biological parents,
the adoptive parents, and even the state itself.4 Some commentators
argue that the best interests of the child should be paramount to a court
in deciding to whom it will award custody of the child.5 Others argue
1. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 188 (I11.) (Heiple, J., writing in support of the denial
of rehearing), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994) (popularly known as the Baby Richard
case).
2. Id. at 190 (Heiple, J., writing in support of the denial of rehearing).
3. See infra part III.
4. See generally H. JOSEPH GITLIN, ADOPTIONS: AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO HELPING
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 3-5, 30-72 (1987) (discussing the procedures in adoptions).
5. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
16-23 (1973) (arguing that if a child has been adopted and has lived with the adoptive
parents for a period of time, the child has come to know these parents as his or her own;
abrupt removal from this environment, in an effort to protect a biological parent's
interest in the child, thus will have severe consequences on the child's psychological
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that the biological parents' rights6 are just as important-or even more
important-than those of any of the other interested parties when
determining who will have the right to raise the child.7 When these in-
terests clash in adoption proceedings, the court must determine whose
interest will prevail. Often, no party emerges unscathed from a con-
tested adoption proceeding.8
Recently, these competing interests clashed in the Illinois case, In re
Doe9 ("Baby Richard r').o In Baby Richard I, the Illinois Supreme
well-being, and because of this, the child should never be removed from the established
parent-child relationship); Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties:
Whose Right to Child Custody is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REV. 705, 742-
44 (1986) (claiming that the best interests of the child standard is the only
constitutional analysis applicable in third-party custody proceedings).
6. Specifically, this Comment focuses on the rights of unwed, biological fathers.
7. See, e.g., Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mylniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents:
Their Effect on Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 FAM. L.Q. 233
(1986) (addressing the need to establish a permanent relationship between parent and
child); Alexandra R. Dapolito, Comment, The Failure to Notify Putative Fathers of
Adoption Proceedings: Balancing the Adoption Equation, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 979
(1993) (focusing on the manner in which courts are addressing the rights of unwed
biological fathers); John R. Hamilton, Note, The Unwed Father and The Right to Know
of His Child's Existence, 76 KY. L.J. 949 (1988) (discussing the unwed father's rights
with respect to his biological children); Stacy L. Hill, Note, Putative Fathers and
Parental Interests: A Search for Protection, 65 IND. L.J. 939 (1990) (addressing how to
better serve the needs of all parties involved in custody cases).
Some commentators suggest other, more unique approaches to parent-child
relationships. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J.
293 (1988) (arguing that the entire approach to family rights issues should focus more
on responsibility than rights); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-
Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993) (creating the
"gestational father" as viewed from a "generist's" perspective).
8. See In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (I1.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). In this
case, unless a subsequent ruling holds otherwise, the adoptive parents will lose custody
of the child they have raised since infancy, the child will be removed from the only
home the child has ever known, and the biological parents will have to struggle to create
a familial bond with a three-year-old child who is a stranger to them. See also In re
Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (popularly known as the Baby Jessica case).
The results in the Baby Jessica case are similar to those in In re Doe cited above. In
addition, Clausen exemplifies the difficulty courts face when reconciling differing state
adoption laws in interstate proceedings.
9. 638 N.E.2d 181 (11.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994) [hereinafter Baby
Richard 1].
10. Subsequent to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Baby Richard I and its
denial of rehearing, the adoptive parents petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the
United States Supreme Court denied on November 7, 1994. Doe v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct.
499 (1994). In the meantime, the Illinois General Assembly amended its adoption law,
see infra part III.C, and the adoptive parents petitioned the Circuit Court of Cook County
for a custody hearing pursuant to the new law. In re Kirchner, No. 78101, 1995 WL
80012, at *5 (Ill. Feb. 28, 1995) (per curiam) [hereinafter Baby Richard II.] Baby
Richard's biological father then petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for a writ of
habeas corpus to require the adoptive parents to surrender custody of Baby Richard. Id. at
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Court invalidated Baby Richard's adoption--over three years after his
adoption-reasoning that Baby Richard's biological father was not an
unfit parent and that the adoption was invalid without the biological
father's consent." In direct response to the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in this case, the Illinois General Assembly amended the
Illinois Adoption Act ("Amended Adoption Act").' 2 The Amended
Adoption Act requires an unwed father who has not established a rela-
tionship with his child to register with the state within thirty days of
the birth of his child in order to maintain parental rights in the event of
a subsequent adoption proceeding. 3 In enacting this Putative Father
Registry provision,"' the Illinois General Assembly attempted to
*1. The Illinois Supreme Court heard oral arguments on January 25, 1995, and on that
same day it issued the writ of habeas corpus with an opinion to follow. Id. On February
28, 1995, the Illinois Supreme Court issued its written opinion of its January 25, 1995
decision to issue the writ of habeas corpus. In re Kirchner, No. 78101, 1995 WL 80012,
at *1. The adoptive parents and Richard's guardian ad litem next filed for recall of
mandate and stay of issuance of the writ of habeas corpus before Justice Stevens as
Circuit Justice for the Seventh Circuit. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 891 (Stevens,
Circuit Justice 1995). On January 28, 1995, Justice Stevens as Circuit Justice denied the
request. Id. at 891-92. The adoptive parents and Richard's guardian ad litem then
undertook applications for stay addressed to Justice O'Connor and referred to the Court.
O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995). The Court denied the applications with
Justice O'Connor issuing a brief dissent in which Justice Breyer joined. Id. See also
infra part III.D (briefly discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in that case).
11. Baby Richard 1, 638 N.E.2d at 182-83. For a complete discussion of Baby
Richard 1, see infra part III.A.
12. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Pub. Act No. 88-550, § 975, 1994 I11.
Legis. Serv. 403-17 (West) (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, §§ 50/1, 50/8,
50/11, 50/12a, 50/12.1, 50/20, 50/20a, 50/20b (West Supp. 1995)).
13. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch 750, § 50/12.1(h) (West Supp. 1995). Section
50/12.1(h) specifically states:
Except as provided in Section 8(b) of this Act, failure to timely register with
the Putative Father Registry (i) shall be deemed to be a waiver and surrender of
any right to notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for adoption of
the child, and the consent of that person to the adoption of the child is not
required, and (ii) shall constitute an abandonment of the child and shall be
prima facie evidence of sufficient grounds to support termination of such
father's parental rights under this Act.
Id. See infra part III.C for a more detailed explanation of the requirements set forth in the
Illinois Adoption Act which allow for a putative father to receive notice of adoption
proceedings in a limited set of circumstances.
14. Generally, "putative father" means "[the alleged or reputed father of a child born
out of wedlock." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990). The Amended
Adoption Act defines "putative father" as:
[A] man who may be a child's father, but who (1) is not married to the child's
mother on or before the date that the child was or is to be born and (2) has not
established paternity of the child in a court proceeding before the filing of a
petition for the adoption of the child. The term includes a male who is less
than 18 years of age.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch 750, § 50/1(R) (West Supp. 1995).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
balance the often conflicting interests that the State has in securing
adoptions, 5 in providing what is best for the child,' 6 and in protecting
the constitutional rights of unwed fathers.'7 This Comment examines
these competing interests and the complex issues inherent in contested
adoption proceedings, specifically focusing on Illinois' efforts to strike
an appropriate balance. 8
First, this Comment reviews the United States Supreme Court
decisions that established a liberty interest in the relationship between
parents and their children.' 9 Next, it examines the background of the
Supreme Court decisions that established the parameters of the liberty
interest which may exist between an unwed father and his child in
adoption proceedings.20 Within this context, this Comment then dis-
cusses the structure of the Illinois Adoption Act ("Adoption Act") as it
existed at the time the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated Baby Rich-
ard's adoption in Baby Richard L2 ' This Comment then discusses the
facts and opinions of Baby Richard 1,22 followed by a brief discussion
of the public outcry and the initial legislative and judicial response.2 3 It
then discusses the Amended Adoption Act, 24 and the Illinois Supreme
Court's refusal to apply the amendments to the facts in Baby
Richard2 It then briefly analyzes the Baby Richard case, 26 and more
fully analyzes Illinois' Amended Adoption Act.27 Next, this Comment
recognizes that Illinois' Putative Father Registry successfully balances
15. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979).
16. Id. at 391.
17. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983). The Lehr Court concluded: "The
intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven
throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility.
It is self-evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in
appropriate cases." Id.
18. In an attempt to provide insight into the legal and psychological considerations
surrounding the competing interests involved, many commentators have written on the
various complex aspects of contested adoptions. See, e.g., supra note 7. A complete
analysis of every consideration involved in contested adoption proceedings is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
19. See infra part II.A.
20. See infra part II.B.
21. See infra part II.C.
22. See infra part III.A.
23. See infra part III.B.
24. See infra part III.C.
25. See infra part III.D.
26. See infra part IV.A. Although the focus of this Comment is primarily on the
Adoption Act and its amendments, the Baby Richard case is briefly discussed and
analyzed. A detailed analysis of the Baby Richard case, however, is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
27. See infra part IV.B-D.
706 [Vol. 26
1995] Illinois' Putative Father Registry
the competing interests which surround contested adoption pro-
ceedings, but this Comment also proposes some modifications.28
Finally, this Comment concludes that the goals of the states must be to
ensure that state adoption laws and procedures are efficient, com-
prehensive, and specific enough to protect all parties in adoption
proceedings.29
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Liberty Interest in Parent-Child Relationships
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of familial
and parental rights in a series of cases.3° Specifically, the Court has
held that the Fourteenth Amendment 3' establishes a liberty interest in
the parent-child relationship.32 This interest coincides with the
parents' duty to care for their children, 33 and stems from the basic
28. See infra part V.
29. See infra part VI.
30. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (addressing the rights of parents in a
termination proceeding); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33
(1981) (holding that the Constitution does not require appointment of counsel for
indigent parents in every termination proceeding); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (discussing procedures for removal
of foster children from foster homes); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (recognizing constitutional protection for the extended family unit); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972) (holding that parents have a constitutionally
protected right to control the education their children receive); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (addressing the rights of parents and their children to disseminate
religious information); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (denying the
state the right to force children to attend public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 403 (1923) (holding that a state could not forbid the teaching of a foreign language
to children who had not passed the eighth grade).
Although this list is not exhaustive, these cases provide a framework in which to
discuss the liberty interest in the parent-child relationship.
31. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. In its opinion, the Court stated:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term has received much
consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated.
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness ....
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
33. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. One commentator
suggests that the duty-rights relationship is embodied in the term "custody":
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history of values in this society.34 Although a state may intrude upon
this interest through regulation,3 5 it may do so only if the state's in-
terest in protecting the child3 6 or the health and safety of its citizens
outweighs the established liberty interest of the parent-child rela-
tionship. 37 Furthermore, the Court has also held that the history and
tradition surrounding the function of the extended family38 elevates the
[Tihe parent's constitutional right to be with, provide for, and control his or
her child is inextricably linked to the parent's duty to provide for the child's
physical and emotional needs. The term "custody" has been used to describe
this intermingling of rights and duties. That the Constitution particularly
protects the custodial rights of biological parents who perform custodial
responsibilities has been stated as a fact and explained in terms of tradition
and natural right .... [Plarents who live with, provide for, and form emotional
attachments with their children perform the social function of caring for
children, and their interests are worth protecting.
Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr
v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 323 (1984).
34. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503. Justice Powell emphasized this relationship in the
Moore opinion: "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." Id.
35. See id. at 499 (citing Prince, 321 U.S. at 166).
36. The term "parens patriae" is often used to describe the interest the state has in
protecting the children who live within the state's borders:
"Parens patriae," literally "parent of the country," refers traditionally to role
of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as
juveniles or the insane, and in child custody determinations, when acting on
behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the principle that
the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as
minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
37. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214; see also Pierce, 268 U.S. at
534-35 (noting that the state action must be reasonable); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400
('The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise
of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.").
This does not mean that the state may not limit parental rights. Indeed, in Prince, the
Court stated: "[Tihe state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and that this includes, to some extent,
matters of conscience and religious conviction." Prince, 321 U.S. at 167; see also
Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 ("Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from
drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful 'respect for the teachings of history [and]
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society."' (alteration in original)
(quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
38. The term "extended family" is used in this context to describe families related by
blood which extend beyond parent and child, often including grandparents and cousins.
"Extended family" is defined as "a larger family group which includes near relatives (as
patrilineal descendants) and which collateral lines are kept fairly distinct." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 804 (1986).
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extended family to a level that is protected by the Constitution.39
Thus, the liberty interest which protects familial relationships does not
apply solely to the biological parent and his or her child.
While the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the biological family unit, it has been hesitant to explicitly conclude
that a liberty interest exists within a "psychological" parent-child rela-
tionship. 4° For example, in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equality & Reform,4' the Court confronted the issue of whether
foster parents have a liberty interest in their relationship with their
foster children.42 In reviewing a statute governing foster parents, the
Court failed to explicitly acknowledge a liberty interest in the rela-
tionship between foster parents and children,43 although it hinted that it
would be more likely to protect such an interest when foster parents
face governmental intrusion than when foster parents face the bio-
logical parents' interests.44
39. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-06. In Moore, the Court held that a city ordinance
limiting occupancy of dwellings in a particular neighborhood to "members of a single
family" violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 499, 506.
The plaintiff lived with her grandsons. Id. at 496. The State determined that this
arrangement violated the city ordinance because the two grandsons were not brothers,
but rather were first cousins and did not fall within the definition of "family" as
prescribed by the ordinance. Id. at 495-97. But see id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart concluded:
The interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single
kitchen and a suite of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives simply
does not rise to that level. To equate this interest with the fundamental
decisions to marry and to bear and raise children is to extend the limited
substantive contours of the Due Process Clause beyond recognition.
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White
agreed with Justice Stevens, stating: "I cannot believe that the interest in residing with
more than one set of grandchildren is one that calls for any kind of heightened
protection under the Due Process Clause." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
40. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
847 (1977).
41. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
42. Id. at 842-47. The child in Smith had lived with the foster parents for more than a
year. Id. at 818 n.1. The foster parents claimed that the psychological bond that was
created between them and the child was worthy of recognition as a true "family" relation
and therefore was entitled to the same protection as the traditional biological family. Id.
at 839.
43. Id. at 847.
44. See id. at 846-47. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, limited the issue to
whether the foster parents had been afforded adequate procedural due process. Id. at 839.
He did, however, address whether the foster parents had an interest in their relationship
With the foster child sufficient to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. While
finding that biology is not the only factor significant in determining whether a liberty
interest exists within familial relationships, Justice Brennan determined:
It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest against
710 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 26
The New York statute at issue in Smith required that prior to
removal of a foster child, the foster parents must receive notice of the
removal, must be allowed to request a conference with the social ser-
vices department,45 and must be allowed a full administrative hearing
upon demand.4 Without specifying whether a liberty interest exists in
the foster family context, the Smith Court held that these procedures
for removing a foster child from a foster home satisfied the require-
ments of procedural due process. 47 The Court noted, however, that
even if a protected liberty interest was at stake, these procedures were
nevertheless constitutional. 48 In this way, the Court resisted an ex-
plicit extension of the liberty interest in family relations beyond
biological connections.49
Moreover, in establishing and setting the boundaries of the liberty
interest in familial relationships, the Court has focused on the rights of
adults. In the process, the Court has left unclear whether any
arbitrary governmental interference in the family-like associations into which
they have freely entered, even in the absence of biological connection or
state-law recognition of the relationship. It is quite another to say that one
may acquire such an interest in the face of another's constitutionally
recognized liberty interest that derives from blood relationship, state-law
sanction, and basic human right-an interest the foster parent has recognized
by contract from the outset. Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist
in the foster family as an institution, that interest must be substantially
attenuated where the proposed removal from the foster family is to return the
child to his natural parents.
Id. at 846-47 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); cf. id. at 857-58 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). While generally agreeing with the Court's opinion, Justice Stewart favored
a stronger position when dealing with this issue:
In these circumstances, I cannot understand why the Court thinks itself
obliged to decide these cases on the assumption that either foster parents or
foster children in New York have some sort of "liberty" interest in the
continuation of their relationship. Rather than tiptoeing around this central
issue, I would squarely hold that the interests asserted by the appellees are not
of a kind that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects.
Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 820 n.3, 829-30.
46. Id. at 830.
47. Id. at 848-49. The Court addressed several factors in determining whether due
process was satisfied. See id. at 848-49. These factors included: (1) the private interest
that would be affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such an interest; and
(3) the government's interest in protecting the child. Id.
48. Id. at 847.
49. Id. The marital relationship, however, plays an important role in setting the
parameters of familial relationships protected by the Constitution. See Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3 (1989) (plurality opinion) (writing for the plurality,
Justice Scalia discusses the importance of the "unitary family," referencing the
importance of the marital family in our society's history and traditions); see also infra
notes 114-36 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of this case.
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reciprocal and independent interest exists in the parent-child rela-
tionship as viewed from the child's perspective.5°
B. Unwed Fathers and the "Earned" Liberty Interest
Although the United States Supreme Court recognized a liberty
interest in the parent-child relationship within the biological family
unit, prior to 1972 unwed fathers had no rights to custody of their
children. 5' By not including the unwed father within the definition of
"parent," early Illinois adoption laws explicitly excluded the need for
the unwed father's consent in adoption proceedings involving his
child.5 2 Historically, adoption laws excluded the unwed father from
custody proceedings because society viewed him as an irresponsible
and usually absent parent, unwilling to assume his responsibility to the
child by marrying the mother. 3
In 1972, in Stanley v. Illinois,54 the United States Supreme Court
finally confronted the exclusion of unwed fathers from the definition
of "parent" in state statutes.55 The Stanley decision invalidated an
50. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the child has constitutionally protected interests which should also be
considered); see also Kirsten Korn, Comment, The Struggle For The Child: Preserving
'The Family in Adoption Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 1279, 1286-90 (1994) (discussing the history of the rights of children, and
suggesting that these rights are often viewed from the parents perspective); Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion). The Michael H. plurality stated:
"We have never had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest,
symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship." 491 U.S. at
130 (plurality opinion).
51. See Korn, supra note 50, at 1297. But see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 7, para. 5 (E.B.
Myers & Chandler, 1867). The early Illinois Bastardy laws required that the unwed father
pay for the support of the child. Id. If the father complied with this requirement, he was
entitled to custody of the child after the child reached a certain age-suggesting that he
had bought the child from the mother and was now entitled to his goods. See id. If the
mother refused to relinquish custody, the father was no longer obligated to make his
support payments. Id. This option was foreclosed in 1949 by House Bill Number 83.
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, para. 2 (1909). The relevant language reads as follows:
The [adoption] petition shall state one or more causes for adoption, the name,
if known, the sex and the approximate age of the child sought to be adopted
and if it is desired to change the name, the new name, and either the name, or
that the name is unknown to petitioner (a) of the person having the custody of
such child; and (b) of each of the parents or of the surviving parent of a
legitimate child or of the mother of an illegitimate child; ....
Id. ('he unwed father was not included in the definition of "parent.")
53. Hill, supra note 7, at 941.
54. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
55. See Karen C. Wehner, Comment, Daddy Wants Rights Too: A Perspective on
Adoption Statutes, 31 Hous. L. REV. 691, 703-04 (1994) (discussing the rights of unwed
fathers before 1973).
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Illinois law which irrebuttably presumed an unwed father to be unfit to
raise his biological child, and which failed to require a court to hold a
hearing to determine his fitness before the State could deprive him of
custody. 6 The Illinois law did not presume that married fathers were
unfit.5 7 Peter Stanley, the father of the children, challenged this law as
a violation of his constitutional rights to due process and equal pro-
tection under the law. 8
The Supreme Court held the Illinois law unconstitutional because it
denied unwed fathers the same treatment as other parents, and thus
denied unwed fathers equal protection of the laws. 59 In particular, the
Court held that all Illinois parents are entitled to a hearing determining
their parental fitness before the State can deny them custody and con-
trol of their children. 60  The underlying facts of this case heavily
56. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650. The Court characterized the Illinois law as follows:
Under Illinois law, therefore, while the children of all parents can be taken
from them in neglect proceedings, that is only after notice, hearing, and proof
of such unfitness as a parent as amounts to neglect, an unwed father is uniquely
subject to the more simplistic dependency proceeding. By use of this
proceeding, the State, on showing that the father was not married to the
mother, need not prove unfitness in fact, because it is presumed at law. Thus,
the unwed father's claim of parental qualification is avoided as 'irrelevant.'
Id.
In Stanley, the mother of the children had died, and the State proceeded to remove the
children from the father's custody because at her death, the children became wards of the
State. Id. at 646.
57. This was true regardless of whether the fathers were divorced, separated, or
widowed. Nor did it make the presumption with unwed mothers. Stanley, 405 U.S. at
650.
58. Id. at 647.
59. Id. at 649. The Court held that "Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a
hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody. It follows
that denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other
Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 658
(footnote omitted). Condemning the State's procedures, the Court noted that "when, as
here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it
explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks
running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child." Id. at 657.
60. Id. at 658. The Court determined that the State's interest here was misguided and
somewhat arbitrary, and did not overcome Stanley's protected interest in his children:
It may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and
neglectful parents. It may also be that Stanley is such a parent and that his
children should be placed in other hands. But all unmarried fathers are not in
this category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children. This
much the State readily concedes, and nothing in this record indicates that
Stanley is or has been a.neglectful father who has not cared for his children.
Given the opportunity to make his case, Stanley may have been seen to be
deserving of custody of his offspring. Had this been so, the State's statutory
policy would have been furthered by leaving custody in him.
Id. at 654-55 (footnotes omitted).
1995] Illinois' Putative Father Registry 713
influenced the Court's decision.6' Stanley's relationship with his
children was significant: he had lived with the mother and the children
on and off for eighteen years62 and had supported the children their
entire lives.63 Because Stanley's interest in his relationship with his
children was substantial, the Court concluded that the relationship de-
served protection and deference under the Constitution, absent any
countervailing state interest.64
Stanley marked the Supreme Court's first significant recognition of
the constitutional protection of the parental rights of unwed fathers.
After Stanley, the Court subsequently expanded upon its analysis of
the parameters of the parental rights of unwed fathers.65
1. The Significance of the Family Unit and the Unwed
Father's Relationship with His Child in Determining
What Process Is Due
In Quilloin v. Walcott,66 the Court appeared to limit its decision in
Stanley by holding that the State of Georgia was not required to grant
an unwed father veto power over the adoption of his child.67 The
unwed father in Quilloin challenged a Georgia adoption law which, in
certain adoption proceedings, required only the consent of the
mother.68 The mother in this case had subsequently married a man
61. Id. at 654.
62. Id. at 646.
63. Id. at 650 n.4. These facts, however, made no difference under the Illinois law
which presumed Stanley to be an unfit parent because he was unwed. Id. at 650.
64. Id. at 651. The Court noted:
Even while refusing to label him a 'legal parent,' the State does not deny that
Stanley has a special interest in the outcome of these proceedings. It is
undisputed that he is the father of these children, that he lived with the two
children whose custody is challenged all their lives, and that he has supported
them.
Id. at 650 n.4.
65. The Court decided four cases: Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)
(plurality opinion); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979); and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
66. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
67. Id. at 256.
68. The Court summarized the Georgia adoption law:
[U]nder Georgia law a child born in wedlock cannot be adopted without the
consent of each living parent who has not voluntarily surrendered rights in the
child or been adjudicated an unfit parent. Even where the child's parents are
divorced or separated at the time of the adoption proceedings, either parent
may veto the adoption. In contrast, only the consent of the mother is required
for adoption of an illegitimate child. To acquire the same veto authority
possessed by other parents, the father of a child born out of wedlock must
legitimate his offspring, either by marrying the mother and acknowledging
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other than the father, and she and her husband wanted to adopt her
children. 69 While the unwed father received notice of the adoption and
was permitted a hearing,70 the hearing focused on the best interests of
the child,7' and afforded the unwed father no right to veto the
adoption. The lower court granted the adoption, finding it was in the
best interests of the child."
The United States Supreme Court held that, under the circum-
stances, the Georgia statute did not violate the unwed father's equal
protection or due process rights.74 With respect to the alleged equal
protection violation, the Court reasoned that a significant difference
exists between the interests of unwed fathers and married, separated,
or divorced fathers.75 The State, therefore, could permissibly distin-
guish between the classifications of fathers in its adoption laws.76
Regarding Quilloin's due process claim, the Court noted that Quilloin
never exercised custody or assumed any responsibility for the care and
upbringing of his children.77 Thus, while Stanley ensured that an
the child as his own, or by obtaining a court order declaring the child
legitimate and capable of inheriting from the father. But unless and until the
child is legitimated, the mother is the only recognized parent and is given
exclusive authority to exercise all parental prerogatives, including the power
to veto adoption of the child.
Id. at 248-49 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 247. Several factors worked in favor of the adoption: (1) the mother had
retained custody of the child for the child's entire life; (2) the court found the mother's
husband fit to care for the child; and (3) the child expressed a desire to be adopted by the
mother's husband. Id. at 251.
For a discussion of a New York statute which allows mothers and their husbands to
adopt the mother's children, see infra note 86.
70. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253.
71. Id. Quilloin, unlike the unwed father in Stanley, was not completely barred from
arguing his fitness as a parent: "[Appellant] was given the opportunity to offer evidence
on any matter he thought relevant, including his fitness as a parent." Id. If Quilloin had
not been allowed to raise the issue of his parental fitness at the legitimation hearing,
presumably he would have had a claim under Stanley. It is true that the legitimation
hearing was meant to determine what was in the best interests of the child; however,
Quilloin's parental fitness was a part of that determination. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253.
72. Id. Quilloin wanted to legitimate his child. Id. at 253-54. Had the lower court
allowed this legitimation, the unwed father would have acquired the power to veto the
adoption. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 255-56.
75. Id. at 256. The Court stated that the unwed father's "interests are readily
distinguishable from those of a separated or divorced father, and accordingly ... that the
State could permissibly give [the unwed father] less veto authority than it provides to a
married father." Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The Court specifically noted Quilloin's absence from his relationship with
his child:
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unwed father will receive a hearing concerning his fitness before a
state can terminate his parental rights, Quilloin demonstrated that an
unwed father may have less protection when the biological mother is
part of the family unit adopting the child.78
In Caban v. Mohammed,'9 the Court once again considered the
issue of the unwed father's consent in adoption proceedings. In
Caban, as in Quilloin, a state adoption law denied an unwed father the
right to consent to the adoption of his child.80 In contrast to the
Quilloin Court, however, the Caban Court ruled that a state law which
did not require the consent of the unwed father in adoption pro-
ceedings was unconstitutional.8 '
In Caban, Abdiel Caban and the mother of his two children,
although never married, had lived together for approximately four
years, during which time the two children were born. 2 In addition,
the children's birth certificates identified Caban as their father, and he
had provided support for the children. 3 After the couple separated,
Caban continued to show interest in his children, often visiting and
communicating with them. 4 The mother subsequently met another
[H]e has never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child. Appellant does not
complain of his exemption from these responsibilities and, indeed, he does
not even now seek custody of his child.
Id.
78. The Court here referred to Stanley:
In Stanley v. Illinois this Court held that the State of Illinois was barred, as a
matter of both due process and equal protection, from taking custody of the
children of an unwed father, absent a hearing and a particularized finding that
the father was an unfit parent. . . . Stanley left unresolved the degree of
protection a State must afford to the rights of an unwed father in a situation,
such as that presented here, in which the countervailing interests are more
substantial.
Id. at 247-48 (citations omitted). The Court went on to explain:
[T]he result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family
unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except appellant.
Whatever might be required in other situations, we cannot say that the State
was required in this situation to find anything more than that the adoption, and
denial of legitimation, were in the "best interests of the child."
Id. at 255.
79. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
80. Id. at 384.
81. Id. at 394. The Court stated: "The effect of New York's classification is to
discriminate against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and they have
manifested a significant paternal interest in the child." Id.
82. Id. at 382-83.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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man whom she later married.85 The mother and her husband then
petitioned for the adoption of the children.86 The lower court granted
the adoption to the mother and her husband, noting that state law did
not require Caban's consent.87 Caban appealed, arguing that the New
York law violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that he had a due process right to a
continued relationship with his children absent a showing of his un-
fitness as a parent.8
The United States Supreme Court held that the law was unconsti-
tutional under the Equal Protection Clause, reasoning that the State
failed to show any substantial relationship between its classification of
unwed fathers and an important state interest. 89 While New York
argued that the state's interest in the well-being of the child was a
legitimate state interest,' the Court concluded that this alone was not
enough to "justify gender-based distinction[s]."9' The underlying
facts of Caban played a significant role in determining its outcome.
The Court distinguished the unwed father in Quilloin from the unwed
85. Id.
86. Id. at 383. Some state statutes allow the mother to adopt her own children. Id. at
383 n. 1. New York's law provided for such an adoption:
Section 110 of the N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law (McKinney 1977) provides in part:
"An adult or minor husband and his adult or minor wife together may adopt a
child of either of them born in or out of wedlock and an adult or minor husband
or an adult or minor wife may adopt such a child of the other spouse."
Id. (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1977)).
Caban attempted to cross-petition for adoption. The lower court found, however, that
he was precluded from doing so as the mother had not given her consent. Id. at 383-84.
87. Id. The New York law provided in part: "Consent to adoption shall be required as
follows: ...(b) Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child
born in wedlock; [and] (c) Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of
wedlock." Id. at 385 (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977)).
88. Id. The unwed father cited Quilloin as supporting authority for this proposition.
Id.
89. Id. at 391.
90. Id. The Court agreed, stating that "[tihe State's interest in providing for the well-
being of illegitimate children is an important one. We do not question that the best
interests of such children often may require their adoption into new families who will
give them the stability of a normal, two-parent home." Id.
9 1. Id. The Court reasoned that the roles of the mother and father were not
substantially different:
[Miaternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance. Even
if unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their newborn
infants, this generalization concerning parent-child relations would become
less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child
increased. The present case demonstrates that an unwed father may have a
relationship with his children fully comparable to that of the mother.
Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
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father in Caban, because the latter had acknowledged his respon-
sibilities and had participated in the care and support of his children.92
Because Quilloin and Caban were fact-intensive decisions, and
because the equal protection analysis differed between the two cases,
the precise interest of unwed fathers in their relationships with their
children remained unclear.9
3
2. Clarification of the Unwed Father's Potential Liberty Interest
In Lehr v. Robertson,94 the United States Supreme Court clarified
when an unwed father's interest deserves due process protection.95
Lehr concerned a New York statute that implemented a "putative father
registry. The purpose of this registry was to ensure that unwed
92. Id. at 389 n.7. The Court claimed Quilloin never addressed the gender-based
classification system in that statute. Id. While the Caban Court's statement is true, the
Quilloin Court implemented an Equal Protection Clause analysis based upon the
distinction between the classifications of parents. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255-56. The
classification system in Quilloin distinguished unwed fathers from both married or
divorced fathers and biological mothers. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
Note, however, that the Court left room to interpret this decision when it stated:
In those cases where the father never has come forward to participate in the
rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State
from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that
child. Indeed, under the statute as it now stands the surrogate may proceed in
the absence of consent when the parent whose consent otherwise would be
required never has come forward or has abandoned the child.
Caban, 441 U.S at 392 (footnote omitted).
93. See Buchanan, supra note 33, at 328-38 (analyzing and discussing the
ambiguities left in the wake of Quilloin and Caban).
94. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
95. Id. at 261.
96. Id. at 250. The New York statute provided:
"1. The department shall establish a putative father registry which shall
record the names and addresses of ... any person who has filed with the
registry before or after the birth of a child out of wedlock, a notice of intent to
claim paternity of the child ....
"2. A person filing a notice of intent to claim paternity of a child ... shall
include therein his current address and shall notify the registry of any change
of address pursuant to procedures prescribed by regulations of the department.
"3. A person who has filed a notice of intent to claim paternity may at any
time revoke a notice of intent to claim paternity previously filed therewith
and, upon receipt of such notification by the registry, the revoked notice of
intent to claim paternity shall be deemed a nullity nunc pro tunc.
"4. An unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of a child may be
introduced in evidence by any party, other than the person who filed such
notice, in any proceeding in which such fact may be relevant.
"5. The department shall, upon request, provide the names and addresses of
persons listed with the registry to any court or authorized agency, and such
information shall not be divulged to any other person, except upon order of a
court for good cause shown."
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fathers, who may come forward and claim an interest in a future
adoption proceeding, express their intent to claim paternity via the
registry prior to the institution of the adoption.97 If registered under
the statute, an unwed father would receive notice of any adoption pro-
ceeding so that he could then be present at a hearing to determine the
best interests of the child.98
The unwed father in Lehr lived with the mother prior to the birth of
the child and visited her in the hospital when the child was born.99
After the birth, however, he did not live with the mother or the child,
and he did not participate in the financial support of the child.'00
Furthermore, his name was not on the child's birth certificate.' The
mother of the child married another man, and she and her husband
Id. at 250-51 n.4 (quoting N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
1983)).
97. Id. at 250-51. It also functioned to enable the unwed father to secure his right to
notice in adoption proceedings. Id. at 251. The Court also noted that New York
provided notice to unwed fathers who fit into one of several other categories:
"2. Persons entitled to notice, pursuant to subdivision one of this section,
shall include:
"(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this state to be the father of the child;
"(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the United
States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the court order has
been filed with the putative father registry, pursuant to section three hundred
seventy-two-c of the social services law;
"(c) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked notice of intent to claim
paternity of the child, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two of the
social services law;
"(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's
father;
"(e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother at
the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the
child's father;
"(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother in
written, sworn statement; and
"(g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six months
subsequent to the birth of the child and prior to the execution of a surrender
instrument or the initiation of a proceeding pursuant to section three hundred
eighty-four-b of the social services law.
"3. The sole purpose of notice under this section shall be to enable the person
served pursuant to subdivision two to present evidence to the court relevant to
the best interests of the child."
Id. at 251-52 n.5 (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § Ill-a(2), (3) (McKinney 1977 &
Supp. 1982-1983)).
98. Id. at 251-52 & n.5.
99. Id. at 252.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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filed a petition to adopt her son.' ° Approximately thirty days later, the
unwed father filed for visitation and for an establishment of pater-
nity103 Soon thereafter, he discovered information about the adoption
proceeding and attempted to intervene. °4 The lower court denied his
request and granted the adoption.0 5 The unwed father appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, alleging that his lack of notice of the
adoption proceedings and the gender-based classifications in the New
York statute violated his constitutional rights."0
The Supreme Court held the New York statute constitutional, and
expressly noted the distinction between unwed fathers who actively
participate in the care and support of their children and those who do
not.'0 7 Because Lehr had not established a relationship with his child,
the Court held that the New York law had not violated his rights under
the Equal Protection Clause.'0 8 The Court also indicated that the mere
biological relationship between an unwed father and his child is not
enough to raise that relationship to the level required for special pro-
tection under the Constitution.109 The Court emphasized, however,
that this biological relationship provided the unwed father with the
opportunity to establish a substantial relationship with his child which,
if accomplished, afforded the unwed father more protection under the
Constitution." 0 Thus, the Court created a specific test for determining
102. Id. at 250.
103. Id. at 252.
104. Id. at 253.
105. Id. The unwed father's request to intervene proceeded through a series of courts
before finally being denied by the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 253-55.
106. Id. at 255. The Court summarized his claims:
First, he contends that a putative father's actual or potential relationship with
a child born out of wedlock is an interest in liberty which may not be
destroyed without due process of law; he argues therefore that he had a
constitutional right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before he
was deprived of that interest. Second, he contends that the gender-based
classification in the statute, which both denied him the right to consent to
Jessica's adoption and accorded him fewer procedural rights than her mother,
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Id.
107. Id. at 266-68.
108. Id. at 267-68. The Court concluded that "[b]ecause appellant, like the father in
Quilloin, has never established a substantial relationship with his daughter, the New
York statutes at issue in this case did not operate to deny appellant equal protection." Id.
at 267 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 261.
110. Id. at 262. The Court explained:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural
father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship
with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of
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an unwed father's interest: "When an unwed father demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] for-
ward to participate in the rearing of his child,' his interest in personal
contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due
Process Clause.""'
Together, Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr indicate that absent a
putative father registry, an unwed father must actively participate in the
support and rearing of his child in order to maintain any parental rights
in an adoption proceeding involving his child."i 2 Once he has created
this relationship, these cases indicate that he has established a liberty
interest in his relationship with his child. Thus, if an unwed father
fulfills his parental duties, states should provide him with notice of the
adoption proceeding and an opportunity to be heard." 3
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-
child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's
development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not
automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best
interests lie.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
I 11. Id. at 261 (citation omitted) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392
(1979)).
The Court also noted that unwed fathers who do not establish such a relationship may
still receive notice under the New York statute as long as they register with the putative
father registry. Id. at 264. Thus, the right to receive notice in this situation was
completely within the father's control. Id. The Court noted:
By mailing a postcard to the putative father registry, he could have guaranteed
that he would receive notice of any proceedings to adopt Jessica. The
possibility that he may have failed to do so because of his ignorance of the
law cannot be a sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself.
Id.
112. See supra notes 54-111 and accompanying text.
113. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White explained the
minimum the states must provide an unwed father who has established a liberty interest
in his relationship with his child: "If the entry of the adoption order ... deprived [an
unwed father] of a constitutionally protected interest, he is entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the order can be accorded finality." Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court decided Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982). Santosky plays an important role in establishing the process by which a state
may terminate parental rights by requiring the state to bifurcate its termination
procedure. Id. at 760. First, the State must determine the fitness of the parent. Id. If the
State finds the parent unfit to care for his or her child, the State may then proceed to
analyze what action would be in the best interest of the child. Id.
While the New York law in Lehr required only a determination of the best interests of
the child in proceedings to terminate the parental rights of the unwed father, the decision
in Lehr does not conflict with Santosky. The Court in Lehr explicitly stated that it was
not addressing the adequacy of New York's termination procedure. Lehr, 463 U.S. at
262-63.
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3. Complicating the Boundaries of the Rights of Unwed Fathers
Six years after the Lehr decision, the Supreme Court, in Michael H.
v. Gerald D.,"4 once again considered the issue of an unwed father's
liberty interest in his relationship with his child. Rather than clarifying
the issue, however, the Michael H. decision further complicated the
analysis of unwed fathers' rights." 5
In Michael H., Carole, the mother of the child at issue, became
involved in an adulterous affair with Michael." 6 During this time,
Carole gave birth to a child, and she listed Gerald D., her husband, as
the father on the child's birth certificate." 7 Carole, however, had also
told Michael that the child might be his." 8 Carole separated from her
husband for some time, and she and the child spent time with
Michael." 9 During this period, Michael supported and cared for the
child, and held the child out as his own. 20 Some time later, Carole
reconciled with her husband and rejected Michael's attempts to visit the
child.' 2' Consequently, Michael filed a filiation action, 122 which he
subsequently dropped when he and Carole reunited.' 23 Carole,
Michael, and the child then began living together, and they signed a
stipulation that Michael was the child's natural father.124 They never
filed this stipulation, however, as Carole left Michael the following
month. 25 Michael then sought visitation rights.126 Prior to this action
by Michael, blood tests indicated that, in all probability, Michael was
in fact the father. 127
114. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
115. For a more complete analysis of this case, see Joan C. Sylvain, Michael H. v.
Gerald D.: The Presumption of Paternity, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 831, 832-35 (1990); see
also Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 16-19
(1992) (discussing the Michael H. case in greater detail); Korn, supra note 50, at 1304-
06 (same).
116. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113 (plurality opinion).
117. Id. (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 114 (plurality opinion).
119. Id. (plurality opinion).
120. Id. (plurality opinion).
121. Id. (plurality opinion).
122. Id. (plurality opinion).
123. Id. (plurality opinion).
124. Id. at 114-15 (plurality opinion).
125. Id. at 115 (plurality opinion).
126. Id. (plurality opinion). Eventually, Gerald intervened in the action and moved
for summary judgment under a California law which presumes a child born into a
marriage to be the child of the husband. Id. (plurality opinion).
127. Id. at 114 (plurality opinion).
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California's law at that time, however, created an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that a child born in a marriage is the legitimate child of the
married couple. 28  As a consequence of such a presumption,
Michael's attempt at proving his fatherhood was irrelevant, as was his
prior relationship with the child. 2 9 Under California law, Michael
thus had no rights to a continued relationship with the child.
The Supreme Court upheld the California law as constitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 Justice Scalia, writing for the
plurality, emphasized the importance of and the tradition surrounding
the sanctity of marriage.' 3' He reasoned that the importance of mar-
riage and the traditional family unit protected the existing family from
Michael's claim. 32 Noting that precedent failed to support Michael's
128. Id. at 117 (plurality opinion). The substantive provisions of the statute read as
follows:
"§ 621. Child of the marriage; notice of motion for blood tests
"(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the issue of a wife cohabiting with
her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a
child of the marriage.["]
Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989) (repealed
1994)).
129. Id. at 119 (plurality opinion).
130. Id. at 119-30 (Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote the
plurality opinion. While Justices O'Connor and Kennedy concurred in part, Justice
Stevens concurred in judgment only.). Michael challenged the California statute on two
grounds. As the plurality summarized: "First, he asserts that requirements of procedural
due process prevent the State from terminating his liberty interest in his relationship
with his child without affording him an opportunity to demonstrate his paternity in an
evidentiary hearing." Id. at 119 (plurality opinion). Second, he "contends as a matter of
substantive due process that, because he has established a parental relationship with [the
child] Victoria, protection of Gerald's and Carole's marital union is an insufficient state
interest to support termination of that relationship." Id. at 121 (plurality opinion).
1 31. Id. at 125 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia explained that "the evidence shows
that even in modern times-when, as we have noted, the rigid protection of the marital
family has in other respects been relaxed-the ability of a person in Michael's position
to claim paternity has not been generally acknowledged." Id. (plurality opinion). This
decision has been criticized by commentators as contradictory to previous cases which
establish a liberty interest in the unwed father's relationship with his child. See, e.g.,
Daniel C. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father's Right to Raise His
Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 980 (1992). One
commentator noted somewhat cynically: "The Supreme Court's opinion affirming the
California decision in Michael H. was largely concerned with the treatment of
irrebuttable presumptions, with the theoretical basis for the protection of 'liberty
interests' under the Fourteenth Amendment, and with tiresome political skirmishing
between Justices Scalia and Brennan." Clark, supra note 115, at 17.
132. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 (plurality opinion). While Michael cited Stanley,
Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr to suggest that a liberty interest exists where there is
biological parenthood in addition to an established parental relationship, Justice Scalia
stated that Michael's interpretation of those cases was distorted: "We think that distorts
the rationale of those cases. As we view them, they rest not upon such isolated factors
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claim, 33 the plurality refused to find a liberty interest in Michael's
relationship with his child. 34 Specifically, Justice Scalia distinguished
the language used in Lehr by noting that, in Michael H., the child was
born into a marriage and was thus legitimate. 35 The plurality, there-
fore, held that the determination of whether Michael's interest in his
child deserved protection is appropriately a matter for state law, and
not constitutional law.13
6
Michael H. and the cases previously discussed'3 7 exemplify the
Court's inability to craft a clear and succinct analysis of the boundaries
of an unwed father's liberty interest in his relationship with his
child. 3 While an unwed father may establish a protected liberty
but upon the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-
traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family." Id. at
123 (plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 125 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia noted:
We have found nothing in the older sources, nor in the older cases,
addressing specifically the power of the natural father to assert parental rights
over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another man. Since it
is Michael's burden to establish that such a power (at least where the natural
father has established a relationship with the child) is so deeply embedded
within our traditions as to be a fundamental right, the lack of evidence alone
might defeat his case.
Id. (plurality opinion).
134. Id. at 127 (plurality opinion). In denying that a liberty interest existed in
Michael's relationship with his child, the plurality noted the importance of state law:
What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive parental rights to
the natural father of a child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital
union that wishes to embrace the child. We are not aware of a single case, old
or new, that has done so. This is not the stuff of which fundamental rights
qualifying as liberty interests are made.
Id. (plurality opinion).
135. Id. at 128-29 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia distinguished Lehr:
Where, however, the child is born into an extant marital family, the natural
father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of
the husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to give
categorical preference to the latter. In Lehr we quoted approvingly from
Justice Stewart's dissent in Caban v. Mohammed, to the effect that although
"'[in some circumstances the actual relationship between father and child may
suffice to create in the unwed father parental interests comparable to those of
the married father,' "'the absence of a legal tie with the mother may in such
circumstances appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive
constitutional claims might otherwise exist."'
Id. at 129 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
136. Id. at 129-30 (plurality opinion). ("It is a question of legislative policy and not
constitutional law whether California will allow the presumed parenthood of a couple
desiring to retain a child conceived within and born into their marriage to be rebutted.").
137. See supra notes 54-136 and accompanying text.
138. Also note that Michael H. was a plurality decision; Caban was a 5-4 decision;
Lehr was a 6-3 decision; and two justices did not participate in the Stanley decisions.
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interest in his child by assuming parental responsibility,'39 a state may
deny him such a liberty interest when that child is born into an existing
marital relationship.' 4° In general, the Court has been content to allow
the states to progress individually in deciding what laws provide the
most reasonable distribution of individual rights in adoptions. 4' This
approach, however, leaves the states and unwed fathers with the po-
tential for great uncertainty.
C. Illinois Adoption Law Prior to the 1994 Amendments
In the State of Illinois, prior to the Illinois Supreme Court's vacatur
order in Baby Richard I, adoption law consisted of the Adoption Act'
42
and case law interpreting the Adoption Act.
143
Only Quilloin produced a unanimous decision.
139. See supra notes 51-113 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 114-36 and accompanying text; see also Jody L. Pabst, Note, In
re Paternity of C.A.S. and C.D.S.: The New Status of Putative Fathers' Rights in
Wisconsin, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1669 (discussing how Wisconsin followed the Supreme
Court's decision in Michael H. and held that when a child is born to a woman married to a
man other than the biological father, the State will presume that the mother's husband is
the father).
141. In Lehr, the Court discussed state participation in defining the legal issues
surrounding the parent-child relationship:
In the vast majority of cases, state law determines the final outcome. Rules
governing the inheritance of property, adoption, and child custody are
generally specified in statutory enactments that vary from State to State.
Moreover, equally varied state laws governing marriage and divorce affect a
multitude of parent-child relationships.
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted);
see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 771 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("State intervention in domestic relations has always been an unhappy but necessary
feature of life in our organized society .... We have found, however, that leaving the
States free to experiment with various remedies has produced novel approaches and
promising progress.").
142. Illinois Adoption Act, 1959 Ill. Laws 1269 (codified as amended at ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 750, §§ 50/.01 to § 50/24 (West 1993) (amended 1994)).
143. See infra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
Cases regarding adoption and custody, and the standards to be applied in those
proceedings must be analyzed carefully because custody and adoption proceedings can
create very different results for the parties involved. In custody actions, the rights of the
biological parents are not necessarily terminated. In re Abdullah, 423 N.E.2d 915, 917-
18 (Ill. 1981) In adoption proceedings, all rights a parent has to the continued
relationship with the child are usually terminated. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750,
§ 50/17 (West 1993).
Consequently, Illinois courts use a different analysis when determining the outcome of
each type of proceeding. In custody proceedings, Illinois courts apply the superior
rights doctrine in conjunction with, and sometimes subservient to, the best interests of
the child standard. See In re Townsend, 427 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (I11. 1981) (defining the
superior rights doctrine as "an accepted presumption that the right or interest of a natural
parent in the care, custody and control of a child is superior to the claim of a third
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The Adoption Act required the consent of each of the child's
parents-including an unwed father-unless a parent was found to be
unfit.' 44 When the father of the child to be adopted was unwed, the
Adoption Act dictated that the unwed father be notified of the adoption
proceeding by personal service, 45 or when the unwed father could not
be located, by publication.' Furthermore, the Adoption Act stated
that the unwed father could not attack the validity of the adoption be-
cause he did not receive notice of all proceedings, if he was initially
served with proper notice. 4
7
Although the Adoption Act required that the unwed father receive
notice of the adoption, his consent was not required in some instances.
First, if the mother or the husband of the mother brought the adoption
petition, the unwed father was required to establish his paternity within
thirty days of being informed that he was the father of the child.148 If
he failed to do so, a court could find him unfit, thus negating the need
person"); People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston, 247 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ill. 1969)
(stating that although a natural parent has a superior right to custody of a child, such a
right may yield when it conflicts with the best interests of the child). In adoption
proceedings, however, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that a court must first find
either that "the minor's natural parents or guardian consent[ed] to the adoption or.
that the natural parents are unfit." In re Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174, 176 (II1. 1990).
144. Prior to Baby Richard 1, the Adoption Act provided that: "Except as hereinafter
provided in this Section, consents shall be required in all cases, unless the person whose
consent would otherwise be required shall be found by the court, by clear and convincing
evidence: (1) to be an unfit person as defined in Section 1 of this Act;... ." ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/8(a) (West 1993) (amended 1994); see also id. § 50/1 (D)
(describing a variety of factors that establish an individual's unfitness under the statute).
The Act also indicated that the consent of a parent to the adoption of his or her child
was irrevocable unless it was obtained by fraud or duress. Id. § 50/11. The time period
within which the adoption could be challenged because of fraud or duress was limited to
12 months. Id.
145. Id. § 50/12a.
146. Id. § 50/7 (West 1993).
147. The Adoption Act prior to the Baby Richard case stated:
In the event the putative father does not file a declaration of paternity of the
child or request for notice within 30 days of service of the above notice, he
need not be made a party to or given notice of any proceeding brought for the
adoption of the child. An Order or judgment may be entered in such proceeding
terminating all of his rights with respect to the child without further notice to
him.
Id. § 50/12a(4). But see § 55/1, which indicates that:
[n]o attack upon or proceedings contesting the validity of an adoption decree
heretofore entered shall be made either directly or collaterally because of the
failure to serve notice on or give notice to the reputed father, unless such
attack or proceedings shall be instituted within one year after the effective date
of this Act.
Id. § 55/1.
148. Id. § 50/l(D)(n)(2) (West 1993) (amended 1994).
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for his consent. 49 Second, the unwed father's consent was not re-
quired if he failed to openly live with the child, or failed to hold
himself out to be the father of the child. 50 While the Adoption Act
stated that the best interests of the child should be paramount in adop-
tion proceedings,' 5 ' the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in In re
Adoption of Syck 52 controlled the process by which the State could
terminate parental rights.
In Syck, the mother and the father of a child were divorced and the
father had custody of the child.'53 The father and his family consis-
tently frustrated the mother's attempts to communicate with the
child.'54 The mother lived in a different state and was unable to afford
frequent visits with the child. 55 The father subsequently married and
petitioned for adoption of the child.'56 The trial court, finding the
mother to be an unfit parent because she had failed to maintain a
reasonable degree of interest in the child, granted the adoption.'57 The
Illinois appellate court affirmed.'58 In affirming, however, the Appel-
late Court applied the best interests of the child standard. 5 9 The
149. Id.
150. See id. § 50/8 (listing factors to be considered when determining whether the
consent of the unwed father is required). Among others, a court could consider whether
the putative father paid for medical expenses incurred by the mother during pregnancy,
whether he paid for the support of the child, whether he visited the child, or whether he
maintained regular communication with the child or person having legal custody of the
child. Id.
151. The Adoption Act prior to Baby Richard I, as well as after the amendments,
provides that "[tihe best interests and welfare of the person to be adopted shall be of
paramount consideration in the construction and interpretation of this Act." Id.
§ 50/20a.
152. 562 N.E.2d 174 (Il1. 1990).
153. Id. at 176.
154. Id. at 176-80.
155. Id. at 177-79.
156. Id. at 179.
157. Id. at 181. "The circuit court held that Mark and Lisa [the biological father and
his wife] had presented clear and convincing evidence that Lorrie had failed to maintain a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to Paul's welfare." Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The language of the appellate court quoted by the Illinois Supreme Court is
as follows:
"We must first look to Paul's present well-being and his future in reviewing
this decision. It is Paul, more so than any other party, who stands to benefit
more or suffer more as a result of the trial judge's decision. After a complete
hearing on this matter in the trial court, the trial judge obviously believed
Paul's well-being and future would be better protected by terminating Lorrie's
parental rights, which eliminated any obstacle for Lisa's adoption of Paul. We
agree with the trial judge's decision."
Id. It should be noted that Justice Heiple, who wrote the opinion in Baby Richard I,
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mother then appealed the decision to the Illinois Supreme Court.'60
In an unequivocal decision, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed,
holding that before terminating a parent's rights, a court must find by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit. 16' The Syck
court further stated that courts can only apply the best interests of the
child standard after finding a parent unfit. 62 Thus, after Syck, courts
could not consider the best interests of the child until both parents
either consented to the adoption or were found to be unfit. 63 Not-
withstanding the clear dictates of Syck,' 6 and the express provisions
of the Adoption Act, when the Baby Richard case came before the
Illinois Appellate Court, the best interests of the child standard became
''paramount."
III. DISCUSSION
A. Baby Richard I: The Illinois Supreme Court Recognizes the
Unwed Father's Liberty Interest
Quilloin, Caban, Lehr, and Michael H. all contained similarities in
their facts which were important to the United States Supreme Court's
decisions. All of these cases involved adoptions where the biological
mother was a part of the family adopting the child. 165 In all of these
dissented in this appellate court decision. Id. Indeed, his dissent may have foretold the
outcome of the Baby Richard case:
Justice Heiple dissented, stating that the circuit court's finding that Lorrie had
failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in Paul's welfare was against
the manifest weight of the evidence; furthermore, Justice Heiple stated that the
appellate court had erred when, in deciding whether to terminate Lorrie's
parental rights, it had first considered Paul's best interests.
Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 184.
162. Id. at 183.
163. See Shelly B. Bostick, The Baby Richard Law: Changes to the Illinois
Adoption Act, 82 ILL. B.J. 654, 655 (1994). It should also be noted that this process is
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982). See supra note 113.
164. A caveat is warranted regarding Illinois case law on adoption. The language
Illinois courts used in adoption cases can easily be taken out of context and interpreted
incorrectly. For example, in In re M.M., the Illinois Supreme Court used language
which suggests that the most important factor to be considered in any adoption case
must be the best interests of the child. 619 N.E.2d 702, 712 (Ill. 1993). However, in In
re M.M., the parental rights of the biological parents had already been terminated, and
the court was attempting to determine whether the custodian's ability to consent to the
adoption of the child could be conditioned upon allowing the biological parents to
continue a relationship with the child after the adoption. Id. at 706.
165. See supra part Il.B.
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cases, the children were past infancy when the adoption proceedings
ensued.' 66 All of the unwed fathers had ample time to establish a rela-
tionship with their child, and the mothers did not preclude them from
doing so. 167 When the mother places the child for adoption at infancy
without informing the unwed father, however, the father has no op-
portunity to establish a relationship with the child. This was the
situation presented to the Illinois Supreme Court in Baby Richard 1.168
1. The Facts and Opinions Below
In Baby Richard I, the unwed father, Otakar Kirchner, claimed that
the adoption of his son by a third-party couple, the Does, was invalid
because he never consented to the adoption. 69 In 1989, Otakar lived
with Daniella, the mother of the child, but they were not married. 70
At that time, Otakar and Daniella were both recent immigrants from
Czechoslovakia. 7' While they were living together, Daniella became
pregnant, and during the pregnancy, Otakar returned to Czechoslo-
vakia for a few weeks to tend to personal matters. 7 2 While he was
there, his aunt called Daniella and told her that Otakar was having an
affair. 173
166. See supra part ll.B.
167. See supra part lI.B. But see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 271 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the unwed father was precluded from establishing a
relationship with his child by the actions of the mother).
Appellant has never been afforded an opportunity to present his case. The
legitimation proceeding he instituted was first stayed, and then dismissed, on
appellees' motions. Nor could appellant establish his interest during the
adoption proceedings, for it is the failure to provide Lehr notice and an
opportunity to be heard there that is at issue here. We cannot fairly make a
judgment based on the quality or substance of a relationship without a
complete and developed factual record. This case requires us to assume that
Lehr's allegations are true-that but for the actions of the child's mother there
would have been the kind of significant relationship that the majority
concedes is entitled to the full panoply of procedural due process protections.
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
168. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Il1.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
169. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 649 (II. App. 1st Dist. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d
181 (I11.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
170. Id. Otakar and Daniella were married on September 12, 1991. Id. at 651.
171. Id.
172. Id. There was no doubt that Otakar was the child's father. Id. The child was
expected to be born on March 16, 1991. Id. Otakar provided support for Daniella while
she was pregnant, and paid for her prenatal care. Id. at 649.
173. Id. While he was away, Otakar's aunt called Daniella and told her that Otakar had
rekindled an old relationship, and that he had married and was on his honeymoon. Id.
Daniella phoned Otakar and confronted him with this information. Id. Otakar denied the
allegations; Daniella did not believe him, however, and broke off their relationship. Id.
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The news of this alleged affair led Daniella to place the child for
adoption, and to move out of the apartment that she had been sharing
with Otakar."' Four days after the child's birth, Daniella consented to
the adoption of the child.'7 She refused to reveal the name of the
father to the adoptive parents, the Does. 176 Daniella then informed
Otakar, who had returned from his trip, that the child had died at
birth.
177
Otakar, however, did not believe that the child was dead, and began
inquiring about the birth of his child.77 After much effort, 79 he dis-
covered that the child had been born alive and had been placed for
adoption.' Otakar then contested the adoption on the grounds that he
had not consented to the adoption.'8' Otakar and Daniella were sub-
1 74. Id. Daniella moved into a shelter for abused women. Id. While at the shelter,
she decided to place the child for adoption. Id. On February 11, 1991, and several times
thereafter, Daniella met with an attorney and the prospective adoptive parents (the
Does). Id. at 650. The dissent in the appellate court's decision contends that Daniella
was pressured into the adoption by a social worker at the shelter. Id. at 657 (Tully, J.,
dissenting).
175. Id. at 650.
176. Id. The Does' attorney, preparing for the adoption of the yet-to-be-born child,
asked Daniella for the name of the father. See id. Daniella refused to disclose his name,
stating that she was afraid he would assert his parental rights if she did. Id. The attorney
made no further inquiries into the identity of the father or his address. Id. at 659 (Tully,
J., dissenting). In mid-February, Daniella moved in with her uncle who lived in
suburban Chicago. Id. at 650.
177. Id. On February 8, 1991, Otakar returned home and found that Daniella had
moved out of the apartment they had been sharing. Id. at 649. Otakar phoned Daniella
at her uncle's house, but she refused to take his calls. Id. at 650. Otakar attempted to
give Daniella money to help with her prenatal care by employing the assistance of a
mutual friend. Id. Daniella refused to accept the money. Id.
178. Id. On March 16, 1991, Daniella gave birth at a suburban hospital. Id. On
March 20, 1991, Daniella executed a consent form for the adoption of her child. Id. She
stated on the form that the identity of the father was unknown. Id.
179. Id. Around the time Daniella gave birth, Otakar began inquiring about the birth
of his child at the hospital where they had originally planned on having the child. Id.
Daniella, however, had gone to another hospital. Id. Otakar also searched Daniella's
home and car for any signs of a live birth, called various hospitals, and searched through
public records. Id.
180. Id. Between May 5, 1991 and May 10, 1991, a mutual friend of Otakar and
Daniella informed Otakar that the baby had not died and that Daniella had given the child
up for adoption. Id. On May 12, 1991, Otakar returned to his home and found that
Daniella had returned. Id. at 651. She informed Otakar of the adoption and expressed her
regret at the decision to place the child for adoption. Id.
181. Id. On May 18, 1991, Otakar contacted an attorney who filed an appearance on
June 6, 1991 in the adoption proceeding. Id. The trial court found that Otakar did not
have standing to intervene in the adoption. Id. On September 21, 1991, Otakar and
Daniella married. Id. Otakar then filed a petition to declare paternity, which eventually
confirmed that he was the biological father. Id. This provided Otakar with the ability to
exercise standing in the adoption proceeding. See id.
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sequently married. 82 By the time Otakar intervened in the adoption
proceeding, fifty-seven days had passed since the birth of the child.'83
The trial court held that by clear and convincing evidence Otakar was
an unfit parent because he failed to show enough interest in the child
within the first thirty days of the child's birth.' " Since he was found
unfit, Otakar's consent was not required for the adoption of his
child.'85
The Illinois Appellate Court upheld the trial court's finding of
parental unfitness. 8 6  Had the court ended its analysis with this
finding, Otakar could have appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court on
the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him
unfit."'87 Instead, writing for the court, Justice Rizzi concluded that the
best interests of the child standard controlled the outcome of the case,
thereby revealing the confusion surrounding the applicable law in
contested adoption proceedings.
8
2. The Opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court
Justice Heiple, writing for the court, quickly dismissed the Illinois
Appellate Court's decision and reversed its ruling. 89 The supreme
182. Id. at 651.
183. Id. at 649. On December 23, 1991, the Does filed an amended adoption
petition, alleging Otakar to be an unfit parent as he had not shown interest in his child
within the first 30 days after the child's birth. Id. at 651.
184. Id. Under ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/l(D)(1) (West 1993), if a parent
does not show a reasonable degree of interest in the child within the first 30 days after
the child's birth, the court may find the parent unfit. The unfitness of the parent must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 747-78 (1982) (holding that "clear and convincing evidence" is the standard which
must be met when terminating the parental rights of biological parents).
185. Under ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/8(a)(1) (West 1993) (amended
1994), the consent of an unfit parent is not required in adoption proceedings. See supra
part II.C.
186. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 654 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d
181 (II1.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). The appellate court stated:
There is clear and convincing evidence that Otakar was an unfit person to have
a child because he failed to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest,
concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a newborn child during the first
30 days after the birth. His consent to the adoption was therefore not required.
Id. (citations omitted).
187. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis with this issue, finding
that Otakar had shown a reasonable degree of interest in his child. Baby Richard I, 638
N.E.2d at 182.
188. Justice Rizzi explained that "[i]f there is a conflict between Richard's best
interest and the rights and interests of his parents, whomever they may be, the rights
and interests of the parents must yield and allow the best interest of Richard to pass
through and prevail. This tenet allows for no exception." In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 652.
189. Baby Richard 1, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
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court held that the evidence did not support the finding that Otakar
failed to show a reasonable degree of interest within the first thirty
days after the child's birth. 90 The court concluded that Otakar's
efforts to discover the existence of his child indicated his interest in his
child.' 91 The court was also swayed by the fact that Daniella frustrated
Otakar's efforts, and that the Does' attorney failed to make any attempt
to find Otakar.'
92
Moreover, the court concluded that Otakar was not given an op-
portunity to establish a relationship with the child and thus was unable
to discharge any parental duties. 93 Finally, Justice Heiple, strictly
applying Illinois law, concluded that the best interests of the child
standard should never have been applied because the father's parental
rights had not been properly terminated. '"
3. The Concurring Opinion
In her concurring opinion, Justice McMorrow expanded on the
court's analysis, first addressing the issue of whether the best interests
of the child should outweigh any other considerations.' 95 Citing the
Adoption Act and Syck, 96 she agreed with the court that the bio-
logical parent must first be found unfit by clear and convincing
190. Id.; see also id. at 186 (McMorrow, J., concurring). "In my opinion, the proof
presented here did not demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent
was an unfit parent under section I(D)(I) of the Adoption Act. Consequently, the trial
court's determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence." Id. (McMorrow,
J., concurring).
191. Id. at 182. See supra note 179 for a description of Otakar's efforts to discover
what had happened to his child.
192. Baby Richard 1, 638 N.E.2d at 182. The court noted that Illinois law required the
adoptive parents to make a good-faith effort to notify the natural parents of the adoption
proceedings. Id. The court concluded that "[tihese laws are designed to protect natural
parents in their preemptive rights to their own children wholly apart from any
consideration of the so-called best interests of the child." Id.
193. Id. at 181.
194. Id. The court explained:
In the opinion below, the appellate court, wholly missing the threshold issue
in this case, dwelt on the best interests of the child. Since, however, the
father's parental interest was improperly terminated, there was no occasion to
reach the factor of the child's best interests. That point should never have
been reached and need never have been discussed.
Id. at 182. Justice McMorrow, concurring in the opinion, wrote a more lengthy opinion
detailing the relevant statutory and case law which supported the decision of the court.
See infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
195. Baby Richard 1, 638 N.E.2d at 183 (McMorrow, J., concurring).
196. See supra notes 152-64 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
Syck.
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evidence before parental rights can be terminated. 97  Justice
McMorrow concluded that the appellate court's emphasis on the fact
that the child had lived with the adoptive parents for his entire life was
"misguided."' 98 While she sympathized with the adoptive parents, she
noted that Otakar contested the adoption less than two months after the
child was born, and that it was not Otakar's fault that the child was
now three years old. 99
Furthermore, Justice McMorrow concluded that the evidence did not
support a finding that Otakar was an unfit parent by clear and con-
vincing evidence.2°° She stressed the severity of terminating parental
rights, and the need for substantial proof of unfitness. 20 ' Finally, she
emphasized the fact that Daniella thwarted Otakar's attempts to dis-
cover the existence of his child, and that the adoptive parents knew
Daniella intended to do so.2°2
197. Baby Richard 1, 638 N.E.2d at 183-86 (McMorrow, J., concurring). Justice
McMorrow emphasized the importance of Syck: "This court's holding in Syck reflected
the express requirements of our Adoption Act . . that parental rights generally cannot
be terminated unless the parent has been proven unfit." Id. at 184 (McMorrow, J.,
concurring) (citing ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/8(a) (West 1993) (amended
1994)). But see infra part III.D.2 (discussing Justice McMorrow's analysis in her Baby
Richard H dissent).
198. Baby Richard 1, 638 N.E.2d at 186 (McMorrow, J., concurring).
199. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring). Justice McMorrow explained:
No one would disagree with the view that children, especially those of tender
years, should not be bantered about between biological and foster or adoptive
parents. Delay damages the child, regardless of who is eventually awarded
custody of the child. The parents, adoptive and biological, also suffer greatly
and unnecessarily. These concerns, although valid, do not justify the
appellate court's decision in the instant cause to ignore the clear requirements
of our Adoption Act that parental unfitness must be proven before the court
can proceed to a consideration of the child's best interests.
Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring).
200. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring).
201. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring). Justice McMorrow explained:
Because termination of parental rights is a permanent and complete
deprivation and severance of the relationship between child and parent, legal
precedent has demanded a heightened standard of proof, i.e., clear and
convincing evidence, in order to prove parental unfitness. In my opinion, the
proof presented here did not demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence,
that respondent was an unfit parent under section I(D)(I) of the Adoption Act.
Consequently, the trial court's determination was against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 187 (McMorrow, J., concurring). Justice McMorrow criticized the actions
of the adoptive parents:
In addition, I believe that the adoptive parents shared a portion of the risk
that the respondent, if he discovered the child were still alive, would attempt
to assert his parental rights to the child. The record indicates that the adoptive
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However simple the decision appeared to Justice Heiple and the rest
of the justices,2  the fact that the child was then over three years of
age complicated matters.2°' Nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme Court,
in its June 16, 1994 decision, ordered the child removed from the only
home and parents he has ever known.205
B. Court Orders Baby Richard Returned to Biological Father..
Public Outcry Prompts Quick Response
The public's reaction to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in the
Baby Richard case was acute.2 Journalists expressed much of the
public's outrage regarding the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
parents were informed of the biological mother's intention to prevent the
respondent from asserting any parental interest in the child whatsoever, by
misrepresenting to the respondent that the baby had died, even though the
biological mother knew the father's identity, as well as his whereabouts. The
adoptive parents acquiesced in the biological mother's scheme. The record is
devoid of any indication that the adoptive parents made any effort to ascertain
the identity of the respondent, or his whereabouts, so that he could be advised
of the child's existence.
Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring).
203. Justice Heiple commented that "[tihe adoption laws of Illinois are neither
complex nor difficult of application." Id. at 182.
204. Indeed, Justice Heiple addressed this fact in the opinion:
Unfortunately, over three years have elapsed since the birth of the baby who
is the subject of these proceedings. To the extent that it is relevant to assign
fault in this case, the fault here lies initially with the mother, who fraudulently
tried to deprive the father of his rights, and secondly, with the adoptive
parents and their attorney, who proceeded with the adoption when they knew
that a real father was out there who had been denied knowledge of his baby's
existence. When the father entered his appearance in the adoption
proceedings 57 days after the baby's birth and demanded his rights as a father,
the petitioners should have relinquished the baby at that time. It was their
decision to prolong this litigation through a lengthy, and ultimately fruitless,
appeal.
Id.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Baby Richard: Case Hits a Nerve in Chicago, S.F. CHRON., July 16,
1994, at A8 ("'How can an old man in a black robe tear a family apart like this?"'
(quoting radio talk show caller)); Richard D. Rotunda, 'Richard' Case Defies the Law as
Well as Logic, CHI. TRIB., July 17, 1994, § 4, at 3 ("Justice James Heiple last week once
again rejected the best interests of 'Baby Richard' with legal reasoning as strange as the
decision he has reached."). Another newspaper article asked:
For how many days must we weep for the children of America? How much
longer do we watch them suffer? The news gets worse each day, for they are
drowned like a litter of unwanted kittens, beaten to death by abusive parents or
given away by a court system that has less regard for their rights than for a
bale of hay.
Patty Uihlein, His 'True' Parents, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1994, § 1, at 24.
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their newspaper columns.27 Illinois Governor Jim Edgar called for a
special session of the General Assembly and promised the public new
legislation 28 which would not only help avoid similar situations in the
future, but which would also attempt to reverse the outcome of the
Baby Richard case. 2°9
In the midst of the wave of public reaction, the adoptive parents
petitioned for rehearing, and during the pendency of the rehearing, the
Illinois General Assembly amended the Adoption Act.210 On July 12,
1994, the Illinois Supreme Court responded by denying the adoptive
parents' request for a rehearing and by reiterating that the lower courts
had incorrectly applied Illinois law.21 Moreover, Justice Heiple wrote
a terse commentary, criticizing the press, the General Assembly, and
Governor Edgar.1 2
207. See Bob Greene, The Sloppiness of Justice Heiple, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 1994,
§5, at 1; Bob Greene, Supreme Injustice for a Little Boy, CHI. TRIB., June 19, 1994, § 5,
at 1; Eric Zorn, Sloppiness Goes a Long Way in Court, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 1994, § 2, at
1.
208. See infra part III.C (discussing the Amended Adoption Act).
209. Jan C. Greenburg, New Law May Upend Fight for 'Richard,' CHI. TRIB., July 6,
1994, § 2, at 1; Edgar Calls for Special Session on Baby Richard Legislation, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., July 1, 1994, at 1.
210. See infra part III.C (discussing the Amended Adoption Act).
211. Baby Richard 1, 638 N.E.2d at 191. Justice McMorrow did not concur here but
saw many issues which needed to be resolved:
Issues that form the basis of my vote to allow the petitions for rehearing
include: the extent of the court's duty to protect children when that protection
may conflict with parental rights established by law; the propriety of the
court's disregarding laws designed to prevent the taking of a child from
biological parents where the evidence of parental unfitness may be
insufficient but where the best interests of the child call for such separation;
whether the broad policy statement in the Adoption Act concerning the best
interests of the child should be interpreted as predominant over the articulated
requirements of the Act; and whether which, if any, of the courts involved in
this case misapprehended, unduly emphasized, or attached inappropriate
credibility to certain evidence presented at trial. Further argument on these
matters would be helpful.
Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting from the denial of the petitions for rehearing).
212. Id. at 189-90. In his opinion, Justice Heiple wrote:
[C]olumnist Greene has used this unfortunate controversy to stimulate
readership and generate a series of syndicated newspaper columns in the
Chicago Tribune and other papers that are both false and misleading. In so
doing, he has wrongfully cried 'fire' in a crowded theater, and has needlessly
alarmed other adoptive parents into ill-founded concerns that their own
adoption proceedings may be in jeopardy.
Id. at 189. Justice Heiple commented further that "[t]he governor, in a crass political
move, announced his attempt to intervene in the case. And the General Assembly,
without meaningful debate or consideration, rushed into law a constitutionally infirm
statute with the goal of changing the Supreme Court's decision." Id. at 190.
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C. The Amended Adoption Act: Illinois Introduces
A Putative Father Registry
In direct response to the public's reaction and to the Governor's
involvement in the case, the Illinois General Assembly amended the
Adoption Act, effective July 3, 1994, significantly altering Illinois'
Adoption Act.213 The Amended Adoption Act introduces a putative
father2"4 registry,215 changes the consent216 and notice217 requirements,
re-emphasizes the best interests of the child standard,218 mandates that
an expedited process be implemented in adoption proceedings, 2'9 and
states that in the event of a vacated or a denied adoption petition, a
custody hearing shall be implemented pursuant to part VI of the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.22°
Other state legislatures also have enacted putative father registries,
which allow the unwed father to secure notice of any future adoption
proceedings involving his child by taking specific steps outlined in the
statutes. 221 By affording a putative father certain procedural pro-
213. Adoption Act Amendments § 975, 1994 I11. Legis. Serv. 403-17 (West)
(codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, §§ 50/1, 50/8, 50/11, 50/12a,
50/12.1, 50/20, 50/20a, 50/20b (West Supp. 1995)); see Edgar Calls for Special
Session on Baby Richard Legislation, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 1, 1994, at 1;
Greenburg, supra note 209, at 1. Indeed, Justice Tully, in his dissent in the appellate
court decision, predicted that the law needed changes. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 664
(Tully, J., dissenting).
214. The Amended Adoption Act defines "putative father" as follows:
"Putative father" means a man who may be a child's father, but who (1) is not
married to the child's mother on or before the date that the child was or is to be
born and (2) has not established paternity of the child in a court proceeding
before the filing of a petition for the adoption of the child. The term includes
a male who is less than 18 years of age.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/1(R) (West Supp. 1995).
215. Id. § 12.1.
216. Id. § 50/8.
217. Id. § 50/12a.
218. Id. § 20a.
219. Id. § 50/20.
220. Id. §§ 50/20, 50/20b.
221. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01 (Supp. 1994) (unwed father must
file claim of paternity within 30 days of the birth of the child); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-
207, 9-9-210, 9-9-212, 9-9-224, 20-18-701 to 20-18-705 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993)
(to ensure notice, regardless of father's relationship with his child, he must register);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1513 (Supp. 1994) (unwed father may register prior to the date of any
termination proceeding); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-1.5-1 to 31-3-1.5-16, 31-3-1-6, 31-
3-1-6.1 (West 1979 & Supp. 1994) (no action by the father can relieve him of the
responsibility of registering with the putative father registry); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 400, 400.1 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) (father who files with the registry is presumed
to be the father of the child); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 211.442 to 211.487, 192.016 (Vernon
1983 & Supp. 1994) (statute defining parent excludes fathers who fail to affirm
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tections, which vary depending on specified circumstances set forth in
the Amended Adoption Act,222 Illinois' new Putative Father Registry
essentially achieves the same effect.223 Specifically, in certain circum-
stances a putative father is entitled to grant or to withhold consent,224
while in others, he is entitled to receive notice of a pending adop-
tion. 5
Under the Amended Adoption Act, a putative father is entitled to
grant or withhold consent to an adoption only if he participates in the
care of the child, regardless of whether he was aware of paternity or of
the child's birth.226 In contrast, prior to the amendments, the Adoption
Act required consent from an unwed father if he participated in the care
and upbringing of his child and had been informed that he was the
father of the child. 7 Presumably, therefore, prior to the 1994 amend-
ments, if an unwed father did not know he was the father of the child,
his consent might have been required even if he did not participate in
the child's care.
Although an unwed father may not be entitled to grant or withhold
consent under the Amended Adoption Act, he may nevertheless be
entitled to receive notice of a proposed adoption provided he registers
with the Putative Father Registry. 8 Under this provision, however,
paternity); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-3, 32A-5-19, 32A-5-20 (Michie 1993) (purpose
of registry is to protect the parental rights of unwed fathers who assume parental
responsibility); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ I11, 111-a (McKinney 1988 & 1994), N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 372-c, 384-c (McKinney 1992) (unwed father can secure notice of
future adoption proceedings by filing with the registry); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 55.1 (West 1994) (repealed) (unwed father must file an intent to claim paternity);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-209 (1991) (unwed father must file intent to claim paternity);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.8 (1992 & Supp. 1994) (unwed father may file notice of
claim of paternity and willingness and intent to support his child); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.025 (West 1987) (unwed father may file any time except after a termination
proceeding).
222. The actions of the unwed father can dictate what rights will be preserved. For
example, if the unwed father registers with the Putative Father Registry, but does not
take any other action to indicate an interest in his child, the Amended Adoption Act only
requires that he be given notice of a hearing determining the best interests of the child.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, §§ 50/12.1, 50/12a (West Supp. 1995). His consent to
the adoption is not needed. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
224. See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
225. See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
226. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/8 (listing the new section of the
Amended Adoption Act which controls the consent requirement); see also id.
50/12.1(g)(3) ("A lack of knowledge of the pregnancy or birth is not an acceptable
reason for failure to register.").
227. See supra note 144 (quoting the language of ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750,
§ 50/8(a) prior to the amendments).
228. The provision requires:
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the unwed father secures only a right to participate in a hearing re-
garding the best interests of the child, and does not have the right to
withhold consent to the adoption.22 9
The Amended Adoption Act also implements another significant
change which purportedly allows the adopting parents to rely on the
mother's written statement identifying the unwed father.23 0 Thus, it
Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of this or any other law, and in
addition to the notice requirements of any law pertaining to persons other than
those specified in this subsection, the persons entitled to notice that a
petition has been filed under Section 5 of the Act shall include:
(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this State to be the father of the
child;
(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the
United States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the court
order has been filed with the Putative Father Registry under Section 12.1 of
the Act;
(c) any person who at the time of the filing of the petition is registered in
the Putative Father Registry under Section 12.1 of the Act as the putative
father of the child;
(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the
child's father;
(e) any person who is openly living with the child or the child's mother
at the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be
the child's father;
(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother
in a written, sworn statement, including an Affidavit of Identification as
specified under Section 11 of the Act;
(g) any person who was married to the child's mother on the date of the
child's birth or within 300 days prior to the child's birth.
The sole purpose of notice under this Section shall be to enable the person
receiving notice to appear in the adoption proceedings to present evidence to
the court relevant to the best interests of the child.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/12a(l.5) (emphasis added).
229. Id. Presumably, if the unwed father has attempted to participate in the
caretaking of the child and the mother has precluded him from doing so, yet he has
registered with the Putative Father Registry, he will have fulfilled the requirements under
§ 50/11 and therefore his consent to the adoption would be required. However, this is
not specified in the statute.
230. Specifically, the Amended Adoption Act provides:
The petitioners in an adoption proceeding are entitled to rely upon a sworn
statement of the biological mother of the child to be adopted identifying the
father of her child. The affidavit shall be conclusive evidence as to the
biological mother regarding the facts stated therein, and shall create a
rebuttable presumption of truth as to the biological father only. Except as
provided in Section 11 of this Act, the biological mother of the child shall be
permanently barred from attacking the proceeding thereafter. The biological
mother shall execute such affidavit in writing and under oath. The affidavit
shall be executed by the biological mother before or at the time of execution
of the consent or surrender, and shall be retained by the court and be a part of
the Court's files.
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appears that if the mother claims that she does not know the father's
identity, the adopting parents have no further duty to discover the
identity of the biological father.23' Nevertheless, in situations where
there is no indication that the putative father has consented to the adop-
tion or at least waived his rights, the Amended Adoption Act seems to
require the adoptive parents to search the Putative Father Registry in
order to determine whether the biological father has registered.232 On
its face, therefore, the amendments to the Adoption Act conflict in their
effect and purpose.233 Accordingly, in a case such as Baby Richard I,
the Amended Adoption Act apparently requires the adopting parents to
request a search of the Putative Father Registry. 4
In addition, by specifying that expediency in adoption proceedings
is in the best interests of the child, the Amended Adoption Act places
greater emphasis on the best interests of the child-an interest already
considered "paramount" in the Adoption Act prior to the amend-
ments.23 5 This broad policy statement 6 functions in conjunction with
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/11(b).
231. Id. § 50/11. See supra notes 228, 230 for the exact language of this provision.
232. While the putative father registry states that the adopting parents may search
the registry to determine if the biological father has registered, it appears that if the
biological father has not consented to the adoption or has waived his right to consent,
the adopting parents must search the registry. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750,
§ 50/12.1. These sections provide the following:
(c) An interested party, including persons intending to adopt a child, a child
welfare agency with whom the mother has placed or has given written notice
of her intention to place a child for adoption, the mother of the child, or an
attorney representing an interested party may request that the Department
search the Registry to determine whether a putative father is registered in
relation to a child who is or may be the subject to an adoption petition.
(d) A search of the Registry may be proven by the production of a certified
copy of the registration form, or by the certified statement of the
administrator of the Registry form, or by the certified statement of the
administrator of the Registry that after a search, no registration of a putative
father in relation to a child who is or may be the subject of an adoption
petition could be located.
(i) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to a child born out of wedlock, if
there is no showing that a putative father has consented to or waived his rights
regarding the proposed adoption, certification as specified in subsection (d)
shall be filed with the court prior to entry of a final judgment order of
adoption.
Id. (emphasis added).
233. See infra part IV.
234. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/12.1.
235. Id. 50/20a. The provision specifically states: "It is in the best interest of
persons to be adopted that this Act be construed and interpreted so as not to result in
extending time limits beyond those set forth herein." Id.
236. Justice McMorrow has commented that she believes the General Assembly's
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two other provisions in the Amended Adoption Act which require
promptness in the initial trial phase, as well as expediency in the appel-
late process.237 These changes attempt to preclude lengthy adoption
proceedings, as well as contests to adoptions.3 8 The justification for
these changes cannot be questioned, particularly in light of the circum-
stances surrounding the Baby Richard litigation.2 9
Finally, the Amended Adoption Act states that in the event of a
vacated or a denied petition for adoption, the court shall institute a
custody hearing pursuant to part VI of the Illinois Marriage and Disso-
lution of Marriage Act.240 Presumably, under this provision, if an
unwed father contests the adoption of his child and the court vacates
the adoption, or if the adoption petition is denied, the father does not
instantly gain the right to custody of his child.24' Instead, the court
must then decide which party should retain custody based upon the
child's best interests.242
focus on the best interests is a "broad policy statement." Baby Richard 1, 638 N.E.2d at
183 (McMorrow, J., concurring) (referring to ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/20a
(West 1993) (amended 1994)).
237. The Amended Adoption Act provides that "[p]roceedings under this Act shall
receive priority over other civil cases," appeals under this Act "shall be prosecuted and
heard on an expedited basis" absent any good cause for not doing so, and if a court
vacates a judgment order for adoption or denies a petition for adoption, "the court shall
promptly conduct a hearing as to the temporary and permanent custody of the minor
child who is the subject of the proceedings." ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/20.
The provision governing the time limit for relief from final judgment or order states
that a petition for relief from such a judgment "must be filed not later than one year after
the entry of the order or judgment," and any appeal under this Act "shall be heard on an
expedited basis." Id.
238. Id. § 50/20b; Bostick, supra note 163, at 658.
239. If, for example, the Does had been required to give up the child they had adopted
when the child was only five months old, very few would have taken such an interest in
the Baby Richard case. In contrast, the child was four years old when the Illinois
Supreme Court ordered the adoptive parents to give up their adoption rights. See supra
part III.A-B.
240. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, §§ 50/20, 50/20b. Under the Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the custody hearing would be controlled by the best
interests of the child standard. See supra note 143 (discussing the standard applied in
custody proceedings).
241. See infra notes 249, 258-63, and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Illinois Supreme Court's analysis of this new provision.
242. See infra notes 244-63 and accompanying text.
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D. Baby Richard II: An Overview of the Illinois Supreme
Court's Final Opinion
Subsequent to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Baby
Richard 1,243 Richard's adoptive parents petitioned for a writ of certio-
rari, which the United States Supreme Court denied on November 7,
1994.2" Richard's adoptive parents then attempted to use a provision
in the Amended Adoption Act that allowed them to petition the Illinois
courts for a hearing to determine who would retain custody of
Richard.2 45 According to the language in the Amended Adoption Act,
the best interests of the child standard, as applied through part VI of
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, would control
the custody hearing.2*
In response, Otakar filed a petition of habeas corpus with the Illinois
Supreme Court to require the adoptive parents to surrender custody of
Richard based upon the court's June 16, 1994 Baby Richard I de-
cision.247 In its Baby Richard II habeas corpus ruling, the Illinois
Supreme Court once again ordered that Richard be returned to his bio-
logical father.2'
243. See supra part III.A.
244. Doe v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). For the complete procedural history of
the litigation concerning Baby Richard, see supra note 10.
245. Baby Richard II, No. 78101, 1995 WL 80012, at *14. The Illinois Supreme
Court summarized the Does' argument supporting the application of the Amended
Adoption Act:
The Does contend that this recent amendment to the Adoption Act, which
gives adoptive parents standing to seek permanent custody of the child in a
failed adoption, applies to the instant case. In support, they argue that the
amendment became effective on July 3, 1994, prior to this court's denial of
the Does' petition for rehearing and prior to the United States Supreme Court's
denial of the Does' writ of certiorari. Because of these post-decision
petitions, the Does conclude that the instant case was still pending after the
effective date of the amendments and thus that the legislation applies.
Id. This amendment applies to all cases pending on and after the amendment's effective
date, thus potentially providing the adoptive parents in the Baby Richard case the
opportunity to apply it to their case. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/20.
246. Id. 50/20b. The amended section provides:
In the event a judgment order for adoption is vacated or a petition for
adoption is denied, the court shall promptly conduct a hearing as to the
temporary and permanent custody of the minor child who is the subject of the
proceedings pursuant to Part VI of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act. The parties to said proceedings shall be the petitioners to the
adoption proceedings, the minor child, any biological parents whose parental
rights have not been terminated, and other parties who have been granted
leave to intervene in the proceedings.
Id.; see supra note 143 (discussing the standard applied in custody proceedings).
247. Baby Richard II, No. 78101, 1995 WL 80012, at *1.
248. Id.
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1. The Court's Per Curiam Rejection of the Does' Attempt
to Retain Custody of Baby Richard
In a per curiam decision, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the
Does' arguments that they should be granted a custody hearing pur-
suant to either the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act or
the Amended Adoption Act.249 The Baby Richard H court began its
opinion by relating the history of the case, and by stressing that the
Does and their attorney did not attempt to discover Otakar's identity. °
The court then reprimanded the Does for their complicity in deceiving
Otakar, and stated that the Does had both a legal and a moral respon-
sibility to return Richard to Otakar when Otakar initially intervened in
the adoption proceeding in 1991.251 The court also reaffirmed that a
parent may not be divested of all parental rights unless that parent is
first found to be unfit,252 and that in the instant case, Otakar exhibited
sufficient interest in his child to withstand a challenge to his fitness as
a parent." 3
The Baby Richard H court then addressed whether each of the re-
spective parties possessed standing to proceed in this case.254 The
court held that Otakar had standing to act on behalf of his son in the
habeas corpus petition.255 In holding that Otakar maintained proper
249. Id. at *18.
250. Id. at *1-*4. The court noted that "[a]t all relevant times, both the Does' lawyer
and the Does were fully aware that Daniella knew who the father was and that she
intended to tell the father that the child had died at birth." Id. at *1.
25 1. Id. at *2. The court criticized the adoptive parents:
We note that at this point [when Otakar intervened in the adoption
proceeding] the adoption proceedings were rendered wholly defective. On June
6, 1991, the Does had both a legal and moral duty to surrender Richard to the
custody of his father. Richard was then less than three months of age.
Instead, the Does selfishly clung to the custody of Richard. They have
prolonged these painful proceedings to the child's fourth birthday and have
denied Otto any access to his own son.
Id.
252. Id. at *3-*4. The court also held that the law places the burden of proof on the
adoptive parents to prove that the unwed father is indeed unfit by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. at *4; see also supra note 184 (stating the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).
253. Baby Richard I1, No. 78101, 1995 WL 80012, at *4. The court stated that
"[t]hrough lies, deceit and subterfuge, Otto was denied any opportunity to establish any
involvement with his child during the first 57 days of his life." Id.
254. Id. at *5-*16. An in-depth analysis of the standing issue is beyond the scope of
this Comment. This Comment will, however, discuss the court's holding as it relates to
the constitutionality and application of the amendments to the Adoption Act.
255. Baby Richard 1I, No. 78101, 1995 WL 80012, at *5. The court held that
Kirchner had properly filed the writ of habeas corpus and that the court had jurisdiction
to hear the writ "pursuant to article VI, section 4(a), of the Illinois Constitution of
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standing, the court noted the distinction between a custody determina-
tion and an adoption proceeding, and stressed the significance of an
adoption proceeding, explaining that the latter terminates all parental
rights.256 The court emphasized that, under Illinois law, a court may
not apply the best interests of the child standard to determine who
should have custody of a child unless a parent has been found to be
unfit by clear and convincing evidence.
The-court then held that the Does did not have standing under the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act to pursue a custody
hearing in the instant case because Otakar had not been found to be an
unfit parent, nor had he ever voluntarily relinquished his parental
rights. 8 The court cited several United States Supreme Court de-
cisions to support this holding. 259 The court stated that once an invalid
adoption is vacated, the adoptive parents cannot utilize the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act to deprive a biological parent
of his or her parental rights. 260 The court held that, under the facts of
this case, application of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act would be improper.26'
1970, as well as Supreme Court Rule 381(a)." Id.
256. Id. at *8; see also supra note 143 (discussing the distinction between custody
and adoption proceedings in terms of the effect they have on parental rights).
257. Baby Richard II, No. 78101, 1995 WL 80012, at *4. The court also noted the
public policy considerations for this holding:
Moreover, we note the extremely adverse public policy ramifications of
holding that parents and their offspring can be deprived of the care, custody
and control of the natural parent through the deceitful circumvention of the
safeguards afforded natural parents in the Adoption Act: namely, the right to
notice and the absolute right to veto the adoption absent a finding of
unfitness.
Id. at *8.
258. Id. at *13. The court stated: "Thus, we find that section 601(b)(2) [of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act] cannot be invoked as against Otto in
the instant case because he has never voluntarily relinquished his right to the care,
custody and control of his child." Id.
259. Id. at *9. The court cited Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)
(plurality opinion); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 392 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); and Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), to support the proposition that "fathers such as Otto,
whose parental fights are not properly terminated and who, through deceit, are kept from
assuming responsibility for and developing a relationship with their children, are
entitled to the same due process fights as fathers who actually are given an opportunity
and do develop this relationship." Id. at *10; see supra part II (discussing each of these
United States Supreme Court cases).
260. Baby Richard II, No. 78101, 1995 WL 80012, at *10.
261. Id. at *11. The court held:
[W]here an unwed father is fit and willing to develop a relationship with and
raise his child, but is prevented from doing so through deceit and an invalid
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The court also denied the Does standing under the Amended Adop-
tion Act because the General Assembly passed the Act after Otakar's
rights had been finally adjudicated.262 The court held that under these
circumstances, allowing the legislative act to intervene and to control
the outcome of the Baby Richard case would violate the doctrine of
separation of powers as embodied in article II, section 1 of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970.263 Essentially, the court foreclosed any option
to attack its Baby Richard I decision, and thus reaffirmed Otakar's full
and complete custody of Richard.
2. The Dissents by Justices Miller and McMorrow
In his dissent, Justice Miller stated that he disagreed with the court's
decision that the Does lacked standing to pursue a custody hearing,
explaining that the record was insufficient to answer certain factualquestions.264 Essentially, Justice Miller disagreed with the court's
conclusions concerning the behavior of the Does in the initial adoption
adoption proceeding, that father is entitled to the care, custody and control of
his child upon the subsequent vacatur of the invalid adoption. Under these
facts, we hold that a section 601(b)(2) hearing under the Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act would be improper because it would contravene
the safeguards afforded unwed fathers in the Adoption Act.
Id.
262. Id. at *14.
263. Id. at *13-*16. The court emphatically expressed its holding:
This court will not be blind to the circumstances surrounding the enactment of
a statute in determining whether it violates separation of powers principles.
The legislative branch of Illinois' three-branch government cannot sit as a
reviewing court over the decisions of the judicial branch which has adjudicated
a suit at law and established and articulated the legal rights of the parties to the
litigation. To hold otherwise would render the separation of powers doctrine a
nullity and threaten the very fabric of our democracy.
Id. at *16. By basing its holding on the Illinois Constitution, the court may well have
been attempting to preclude review by the United States Supreme Court by narrowing its
holding to Illinois law. See infra note 289.
264. Baby Richard 11, No. 78101, 1995 WL 80012, at *18, *20 (Miller, J.,
dissenting). Justice Miller wanted to remand the case to the circuit court for a hearing to
determine the factual issues raised under section 601(b)(2) of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act:
I agree with the majority's premise that a nonparent seeking standing under
section 601(b)(2) must not have acted illicitly in gaining custody of the child.
That inquiry, however, raises a number of important factual questions that
have not previously been resolved. Indeed, determinations of standing under
section 601(b)(2) are fact-intensive inquiries that require consideration of a
number of circumstances. Nonetheless, the majority proceeds to resolve these
issues without the benefit of a factual record adequate to support the opinion's
conclusions.
Id. at *20 (Miller, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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proceedings.265
Justice McMorrow also dissented in the Baby Richard II case.2' In
a forceful and lengthy opinion, Justice McMorrow criticized the court
for its characterization of the facts.267 She believed that the record
failed to show that the Does and their attorney participated in a scheme
to deceive Otakar.268 Moreover, Justice McMorrow suggested that
Otakar was an unfit parent who had known of the existence of his
child since the child's birth.269
Justice McMorrow also opined that Otakar lacked standing to bring
a habeas corpus petition, as his interests conflicted with those of
Richard. She believed that after the court's order of vacatur of the
Does' adoption petition, Richard became a ward of the court who
remained in the temporary custody of the Does.27' Justice McMorrow
explained that because Richard was a ward of the court, the court was
responsible for acting on behalf of the child's well-being. 2  Ac-
cordingly, Justice McMorrow concluded that a custody hearing to
determine the best interests of the child would have been appro-
priate.273
265. Id. at *20-*21 (Miller, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at *22-*47 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at *22-*26 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at *24-*25 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow believed that the
adoptive parents had no way of finding out who or where Otakar was:
[Tihere is nothing in the record to indicate that the Does or their attorney had
or were able to obtain information regarding Kirchners [sic] identity or
residence. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to establish that the Does
or their counsel knew of friends or relatives who might have revealed
Kirchner's identity or whereabouts.
Id. at *24 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at *22-*25 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow characterized
Otakar as abusive, too busy to marry the woman who would bear his child, and a heavy
gambler. Id. at *23-*24 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at *27 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow stated that "Kirchner
represents his own interests. The Does represent their own and Richard's interests,
based on their family relationship." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
271. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at *32 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
273. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow expressed much of the
sentiment surrounding the Baby Richard case:
My conviction that the Does have standing, or interests in the outcome of
Richard's custody placement, is also partially rooted in common sense, which
recognizes their central role in his life as his parents in every sense of the
word except biologically. Moreover, they are the only ones who have ever
had legal and physical custody of the child, following the voluntary
termination of the biological mother's rights four days after the baby was bom
[sic]. Case law reveals that they not only have "standing" but are necessary
and proper parties to such hearing.
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Furthermore, Justice McMorrow stated that applying the Amended
Adoption Act to the Baby Richard case would not violate the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine, as the Baby Richard case was still pending
at the time the General Assembly passed the Amended Adoption
Act.274 According to Justice McMorrow, since the amendments to the
Adoption Act applied to the case, and since the amendments had not
been held constitutionally infirm, the Does should have been allowed a
custody hearing pursuant to the Amended Adoption Act. 27 5 Justice
McMorrow also opined that a custody hearing would not violate
Otakar's constitutional rights because a custody determination would
not divest him of all his parental rights.276 Finally, Justice McMorrow
stated that allowing Otakar to bring the habeas corpus petition violated
Richard's constitutional and statutory rights.277
Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
274. Id. at *38-*39 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow explained:
Until rehearing was denied and the United States Supreme Court denied review
by certiorari, the case was still "pending" in the courts and was not yet "final"
for the purpose of applying the recent amendments to the Adoption Act. In
addition, this court stayed its mandate in the instant case pending review by
the United States Supreme Court. Unless and until the mandate issues, there is
no final or enforceable judgment.
Id. at *38 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at *37-*40 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow stated that,
"[t]hese unambiguous provisions grant the Does direct standing to participate in a
hearing regarding Richard's-custody. Therefore, unless the amendments do not apply or
are held to be constitutionally infirm, Kirchner's challenge to the Does' standing in a
custody hearing is wholly foreclosed." Id. at *38 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at *46 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow distinguished the
United States Supreme Court cases on which the majority relied, stating:
Unlike the issues before this court at this time, Caban, Quilloin, Lehr, and
Michael H. involved the complete and irrevocable termination of parental
rights of an unwed father and not a custody determination .... Only Stanley
involved a custody determination. An unwed father's right to a hearing in a
custody determination is the extent of Kirchner's due process rights under
Stanley.
Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
277. Id. at *40-*42 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow believed that
Richard had a right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution to determine where his best interests lay. Id. at *41
(McMorrow, J., dissenting). While she conceded that the United States Supreme Court
had not established a liberty interest in a child's relationship with his or her family, she
believed that procedural due process protected Richard as Illinois' Amended Adoption
Act provided him with the right to a hearing to determine his best interests in the instant
case. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow believed that "[t]he State of
Illinois ha[d] conferred upon Richard a liberty interest in his emotional and
psychological relationship with the Does. The State cannot deprive Richard of this
interest without following the procedures provided by State statute." Id. (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Beginning with Stanley v. Illinois, an unwed father's right to par-
ticipate in the custody and control of his child has expanded
significantly over time. 278 The United States Supreme Court tempered
this expansion, however, by requiring that an unwed father must in
some way actively participate in the care and nurturing of his child in
order to establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest.27 ' The
inherent value of the parent-child relationship,28 the importance of the
responsibilities surrounding parenting,21' and the continued reliance on
the institution of marriage to assist in defining legal issues2 2 all help to
create boundaries which define the unwed father's liberty interest in
his relationship with his child.283
This liberty interest, however, coexists with other potentially com-
peting interests. Aside from this liberty interest, states have an interest
in securing adoptions, 28 as well as an interest in protecting chil-
278. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
279. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983); see supra notes 94-111 and
accompanying text.
280. The Court in Stanley stressed the importance of this relationship by stating:
The private interest . . . of a man in the children he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children "come[s] to this Court with a
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive
merely from shifting economic arrangements."
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citation omitted).
281. Justice Stevens stressed the importance of parental responsibility in Lehr:
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities
of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,"
his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection
under the Due Process Clause. At that point it may be said that he "act[s] as a
father toward his children." But the mere existence of a biological link does
not merit equivalent constitutional protection .... [T]he importance of the
familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems
from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through
the instruction of children ... as well as from the fact of blood relationship."
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
282. Id. at 256-57; see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
283. Baby Richard 1, 638 N.E.2d at 182. In Baby Richard i, Justice Heiple explained
that Illinois' adoption "laws are designed to protect natural parents in their preemptive
rights to their own children wholly apart from any consideration of the so-called best
interests of the child. If it were otherwise, few parents would be secure in the custody of
their own children." Id.
284. Illinois states its concern in the introduction to House Bill 2424:
WHEREAS, The legislature declares that children are our society's most valued
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dren.285 In balancing these interests, states must also attempt to stay
within the boundaries established by the United States Supreme
Court.286 Illinois' Amended Adoption Act, while needing some re-
vision, successfully balances these complicated issues and will help to
avoid future tragedies similar to the one that resulted from the Baby
Richard litigation.
A. The Tragedy of Baby Richard
The Baby Richard case produced a tragic result for all parties in-
volved: the adoptive parents lost custody of Richard, a child who they
raised as their own; the biological father must attempt to build a parent-
child relationship with a child he has never met; and Richard must
adapt to living away from the only home he has even known. 287 The
Illinois Supreme Court, however, correctly analyzed and followed the
applicable law and precedent when it held in Baby Richard I that
Richard's adoption improperly terminated the biological father's paren-
tal rights.288 Furthermore, in Baby Richard II, the Illinois Supreme
Court correctly stood firm in its previous decision in favor of the bio-
logical father, by holding that the Does lacked standing to seek a
custody hearing, and that the Amended Adoption Act could not be
applied to Baby Richard without running afoul of the Illinois Consti-
219tution.
resource; and
WHEREAS, In recent years, growing numbers of children have been denied the
benefit and comfort of safe, appropriate, and permanent care from biological,
adoptive, or foster parents; and
WHEREAS, In order to best serve the interests of the children of Illinois, the
legislature must take steps to ensure that biological parents are accorded
reasonable opportunities to acknowledge their parenthood, adoptive parents
are able to reasonably rely on the adoption courts for timely completion of
adoptions, and foster parents are included as responsible members of the State
child welfare system ....
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Pub. Act No. 88-550, § 101, 1994 111. Legis.
Serv. 381 (West).
285. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
286. See supra part IL.A-B.
287. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
288. See supra part III.A for a detailed discussion of Baby Richard I.
289. Baby Richard H, No. 78101, 1995 WL 80012, at *14-*15. See supra part III.D
for a discussion of Baby Richard I.
By avoiding a ruling on the Amended Adoption Act's constitutionality under the
Federal Constitution, the Illinois Supreme Court may have effectively precluded further
review by the United States Supreme Court. Prior to the issuance of the written opinion
of Baby Richard 1I, Justice O'Connor stated: 'That we are left guessing about the basis
for the Illinois Supreme Court's decision, particularly when opinions are forthcoming,
gives me considerable pause. A decision that the Federal Constitution invalidates the
1995]
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The Adoption Act in effect when the Illinois Supreme Court vacated
the adoption order provided that courts must determine parental fitness
prior to terminating parental rights."g Moreover, the Illinois Supreme
Court's own holding in Syck indicated that parental fitness must be
determined before courts apply the best interests of the child standard,
essentially ensuring that once a parent establishes a protected liberty
interest in the parent-child relationship, courts will not terminate that
parent's rights.29'
In deciding that the best interests of the child standard controlled the
outcome of Baby Richard I, the Illinois Appellate Court disregarded
the precedential significance of the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in
Syck, 292 and pieced together an odd combination of statutes 293 and
case law294 to reach this conclusion. Upon reviewing the appellate
court's decision in Baby Richard I, the Illinois Supreme Court merely
reversed this application of Illinois law.295
Illinois statute may raise a conflict with decisions of other courts." See O'Connell v.
Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
290. See supra part II.C (discussing Illinois adoption law prior to the court's vacatur
order in Baby Richard 1).
291. See supra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
292. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 652 n.2 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1993).
293. Justice Rizzi cited language in the Illinois Juvenile Court Act and the Federal
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. Id. at 653 (citing ILL. COMP. STAT.
ch. 750, § 405/2-14 (West 1992) and 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1988)).
We extrapolate and infer from the Juvenile Court Act, as amended, and the
federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Public Law 96-
272, as amended, that after a newborn child has been placed for adoption and
lives continuously thereafter for longer than 18 months with his adopting
parents who adopt or have adopted him pursuant to a judgment of adoption, it
would be contrary to the best interest of the child to remove him from his
home and family by disturbing the judgment of adoption.
Id. (citations omitted).
294. To support the use of the best interests of the child standard, Justice Rizzi cited
In re Abdullah, 423 N.E.2d 915 (I11. 1981), Edwards v. Livingston, 247 N.E.2d 417 (I11.
1969), and In re Ashley K., 571 N.E.2d 905 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1991). However, these
cases are clearly distinguishable. In Edwards, the court was not terminating parental
rights; it was merely deciding custody. 247 N.E.2d at 221. Moreover, Edwards was
decided before Syck. In Abdullah, which was also decided prior to Syck, the father had
already been found unfit when the court applied the best interests of the child standard.
423 N.E.2d at 917. Finally, in Ashley K., the court was, once again, only deciding
which party would be allowed custody. The court was not terminating parental rights. In
re Ashley K., 571 N.E.2d at 923. It is noteworthy that Justice Rizzi wrote the opinion
in Ashley K.
295. Justice Heiple, writing for the court in the Baby Richard 1, noted:
The adoption laws of Illinois are neither complex nor difficult of application.
Those laws intentionally place the burden of proof on the adoptive parents in
establishing both the relinquishment and/or unfitness of the natural parents
and, coincidentally, the fitness and the right to adopt of the adoptive parents.
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The fact that it took more than three years for a final determination in
the Baby Richard case 96 created the tragedy in the outcome. In deter-
mining the unfitness of a biological parent, a court must undertake the
difficult task of evaluating that parent's behavior toward his or her
child.2 97 While it could be argued that the biological father in the Baby
Richard case did not show sufficient interest in his child within the
first thirty days of the child's birth, or within thirty days after he
discovered the child's existence, it could also be argued that he did in
fact show sufficient interest.298 Regardless of the decision rendered, if
it had been made shortly after the issue first arose, the impact on the
parties would have been far less significant.2 9 9  The changes in
Illinois' Amended Adoption Act successfully provide protection for
these interests so that the impact upon future parties will not be as
severe.
B. Illinois' Amended Adoption Act. Adequate
Protection for Unwed Fathers?
In most instances, Illinois' Amended Adoption Act adequately pro-
tects the unwed father's liberty interest in his relationship with his
child. In Baby Richard-type cases, however, where through deceit the
father is unaware of the child's birth, the Amended Adoption Act fails
In addition, Illinois Law requires a good-faith effort to notify the natural
parents of the adoption proceedings. These laws are designed to protect
natural parents in their preemptive rights to their own children ....
Baby Richard 1, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
296. As of the date of this Comment, the litigation of the Baby Richard case has not
yet reached its conclusion. Baby Richard has, however, been returned to his biological
father, Otakar. See Alex Rodriguez, Traumatic Day Tries Neighbors' Emotions, CHI SUN-
TIMES, May 1, 1995, at 7 (Baby Richard was returned to Otakar on April 30, 1995);
Chronology of Case, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 1, 1995, at 7 (detailing the chronology of
the Baby Richard case). For the complete procedural history of the litigation
concerning Baby Richard, see supra note 10.
While the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the Does could not bring a custody
hearing, the court did not rule on the constitutionality or application of the amendments
to the Adoption Act.
297. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/I(D) (West Supp. 1995).
298. The difficulty of such an evaluation is evidenced by the Baby Richard case itself.
In her dissenting opinion from the denial of the petitions for rehearing, Justice
McMorrow expressed concern that the "courts involved in this case [could have]
misapprehended, unduly emphasized, or attached inappropriate credibility to certain
evidence presented at trial." Baby Richard 1, 638 N.E.2d at 191 (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting). It is just as plausible from the facts of the Baby Richard case that the
biological father did in fact show enough interest. See In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 656-66
(Tully, J., dissenting) (arguing that the biological father's attempts to discover the
existence of his child showed an adequate degree of interest).
299. Dapolito, supra note 7, at 1023-24.
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to protect the father's liberty interest in his relationship with his child.
Initially, the Amended Adoption Act provides that a father gains the
right to consent to the adoption of his child if he minimally participates
in the care and nurturing of his child.300 Accordingly, an unwed father
can gain the right to consent to the adoption of his child by doing con-
siderably less than a fully committed parent.30' For example, if an
unwed mother initiates a paternity action against an unwilling unwed
father and the court enters an order finding him to be the legal father,
the unwed father gains the right to grant or to withhold consent to the
adoption of his child.30 2 Moreover, if the unwed father pays for the
medical expenses of the child's birth and provides for the financial
support of the child, he gains the right to consent to the adoption
without ever providing any of the emotional or psychological support
that a child requires. 303
In addition, Illinois' Amended Adoption Act adequately protects an
unwed father's inchoate31 liberty interest. Under the Act, an unwed
father can secure his right to notice of future adoption proceedings by
simply registering with the Putative Father Registry.30 5 Once notified,
300. See supra part III.C.
301. See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental
Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991).
The way the father can undertake his limited degree of parental responsibility
is . . . noteworthy. A father can choose: does he want to provide custodial
care, a personal relationship, or financial support? Whichever he picks, that
is enough.... Should the mother have any choice about what parenting work
the father undertakes? Should she have a choice about the work she
undertakes? By not mentioning this issue, the [United States] Supreme Court
in Lehr v. Robertson confirms that the mother's choice is nonexistent.
Id. at 1420.
302. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/8.
303. Id. One commentator criticized the effect of provisions such as this:
Monetary support is no doubt important to children. Nonetheless, this
definition of parental equality fails to address the other types of caring that a
child needs. As one court put it,
We can best provide for the support of minors by avoiding artificial
division of the panoply of parental responsibilities and looking to the
capacity of the parties involved. Support, as every other duty encompassed
in the role of parenthood, is the equal responsibility of both mother and
father.
Czapanskiy, supra note 301, at 1434 (quoting Conway v. Dana, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (Pa.
1974)).
304. His interest is described as inchoate because while he has not established a
relationship with his child, the- potential exists, and if he actively participates in the
care and nurturing of his child, he will develop a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in his relationship with his child. All that is required is action by the unwed
father.
305. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/12.1.
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the father can participate in a hearing to determine the best interests of
the child.3° While this provision does not provide the father with the
ability to withhold consent to the adoption, without additional efforts
by the father to indicate his interest in the child, such a right has not
been earned.0 7
This protection is consistent with the previously discussed United
States Supreme Court decisions, 308 and at least arguably mirrors so-
ciety's values regarding the responsibilities a parent should assume. 309
The mere biological relationship between an unwed father and his child
is simply insufficient to establish a protected liberty interest. 30 The
306. Id.
307. One commentator suggested:
The opportunity interest is constitutionally protected only to the extent that
the biological father who claims protection wants to make the commitments
and perform the responsibilities that give rise to a developed relationship
because it is only the combination of biology and custodial responsibility
that the Constitution ultimately protects.
Buchanan, supra note 33, at 368 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, this commentator
also recognized that:
[wihen the state has no official evidence, such as prior termination, consent,
or waiver, that a biological father has lost his opportunity interest, and the
state may not assume from the combination of passage of time and assumption
of parental responsibility by another that the father's interest has lapsed, the
father's biological connection alone requires the state to notify him of
proceedings in which it may irrevocably cut off his opportunity to turn his
potential relationship into an actual one.
Id.
308. See supra part II.A-B.
309. Undeniably, a child is a dependent who relies upon the adult parent to provide
for his or her needs. One commentator has noted the recognition of the importance of
this relationship:
Since the earliest days of the modem liberal state, parenthood has been
expressed in terms of exchange: Parents have rights with respect to their
children in exchange for the performance of their parental responsibilities.
Sir William Blackstone, John Locke, and Samuel Pufendorf, for example, all
state that the rights or powers of parents arise from their duties in caring for
their offspring. As Locke writes, "the Power ... that Parents have over their
Children, arises from that Duty which is incumbent upon them, to take care of
their Off-spring, during the imperfect state of Childhood."
Bartlett, supra note 7, at 297 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 348-
49 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (3d ed. 1698)).
The experience and meaning of responsibility may be quite personal and
individualized. Its meaning, however, is derived within a social context that
defines ideal roles for persons engaged in particular relationships. Thus,
while individuals to a certain extent choose the terms of their own
relationships, the choices they make and the meaning given to those choices
are strongly shaped by role expectations defined by the community.
Id. at 299 (citations omitted).
310. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
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United States Supreme Court stated in Lehr v. Robertson3 ' that the
biological relationship provides the unwed father with the unique
opportunity to establish a relationship." 2 If the father fails to seize this
opportunity, and merely registers with the Putative Father Registry, he
simply has not indicated an interest which is worthy of constitutional
protection.313
Moreover, the Amended Adoption Act provides that if an unwed
father registers with the Putative Father Registry, and commences a
parentage action within thirty days of the registration, he will obtain
the ability to withhold consent to any adoption proceedings. 1 4 Again,
this seems generous when compared to the duties and the respon-
sibilities of the unwed mother who presumably must feed, clothe,
nurture, protect, house, and provide for the child's medical needs.315
The unwed father, merely by taking two legal actions, gains the right
to control the actions and the wishes of the mother, and can signifi-
cantly influence who will have the right to raise the child by
withholding consent to any adoption proceeding.1 6
311. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
312. Id. at 262.
3 13. See Buchanan, supra note 33, at 368-71. This statement perhaps exemplifies a
value judgment. It is supported, however, by the United States Supreme Court decisions
discussed in part II.B, supra, and expresses this author's moral values. There may be an
inherent danger in attempting to control the behavior of individuals based upon such
values. One commentator explains the danger of forcing moral values upon society via
state law:
When I speak of societal construction of parenthood, I refer to a process of
community norm-building about what it means to be a parent. This process
might lead to the prohibition of individual choices. Communities can be
repressive. Thus individuals must, and do, sometimes resist, fending off the
community as it attempts to shape individuals to its own vision. . . . The
struggle between the community speaking in a common voice and individuals
speaking in many voices is a struggle inevitable in any society that attempts
to set itself on liberal foundations.
Bartlett, supra note 7, at 304-05 (citations omitted).
314. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/8.
315. An unwed mother who does not provide for her child may well be found unfit and
can lose custody of her child. See id. § 50/I (defining "unfit person"). Indeed, the law
can treat unwed mothers and unwed fathers very differently. One commentator notes:
The discrepant treatment of unwed mothers and fathers with respect to
responsibilities toward their children must, therefore, arise from a source other
than the reliability of identification [of the unwed father]. A more likely
source is the notion that family law supports and reinforces fathers as
volunteers. The father can evade or at least delay the imposition of a family
relationship. On the other hand, if he wants a family relationship, he can
claim it, and the mother has only limited means to deny it to him.
Czapanskiy, supra note 301, at 1431.
316. See supra note 300-07 and accompanying text.
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These provisions of the Amended Adoption Act adequately safe-
guard the father's constitutionally protected liberty interest in his child
even though they place upon the unwed father the burden of ensuring
that he is informed of the child's birth.317 This burden, in essence,
requires that the father participate in some manner in his relationship
with the child or with the mother prior to the birth of the child.3"8 This
burden is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's previous
decisions.319 The unwed father has a unique relationship with his
child as he has participated in the child's conception.320 Just as the
unwed father is required to earn his constitutionally protected liberty
interest in his relationship with his child, he must also actively partici-
pate prior to the birth of the child to ensure that he has knowledge of
the impending birth.32'
When an unwed father is unaware of the child's existence due to the
mother's deception, however, the Amended Adoption Act fails to
protect the unwed father's liberty interest in his child. Specifically, the
Amended Adoption Act provides that upon the vacatur or denial of an
322 wihnadoption petition, which necessarily requires a finding that the
unwed father is fit, "the court shall promptly conduct a [custody]
hearing ... pursuant to Part VI of the Illinois Marriage and Disso-
lution Act., 323 This hearing focuses on the best interests of the child,
and essentially disregards the unwed father's liberty interest.324 Ac-
cordingly, this provision in the Amended Adoption Act denies the
father his constitutionally protected liberty interest in his child. 32'
317. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/12.1.
3 18. Indeed, marriage was an option for Otakar Kirchner, the unwed father in the
Baby Richard case. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 657 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1993) (Tully, J.,
dissenting).
3 19. See supra part II.A-13.
320. This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's language in Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), where the Court found that the unwed father had a
unique opportunity to establish a relationship with his child that no other man
possesses. See supra part II.B.2.
321. The unwed father in the Baby Richard case provides an example. Otakar's
participation with the mother prior to the birth of their child alerted him to the
impending birth. He was on notice that his child would be born within a certain time
frame, and under the Amended Adoption Act could easily have secured his right to notice
and consent. Indeed, this knowledge led to his actions which, after a long and protracted
custody battle, won him the right to custody of his child.
322. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
323. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, §§ 50/20, 50/20b.
324. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
325. In fact, when ruling on the standing of the Does to seek a custody hearing under
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the Illinois Supreme Court
indicated in Baby Richard 1I that (1) when an adoption is vacated or denied, and (2) the
unwed father wishes to retain custody, and (3) the father is unaware of his child's
1995]
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C. The Best Interests of the Child
Illinois' Amended Adoption Act reinforces the policy that the best
interests of the child 26 are paramount, and provides protection for the
child who has established a home with adoptive parents.12' First, the
Amended Adoption Act protects the child from protracted contested
adoption proceedings.328 By mandating an expedited trial and appeal
process in contested adoptions,329 the Act ensures that a Baby Richard-
type situation will not arise.330 Essentially, the child is less likely to
end up in legal limbo, tentatively waiting to find out which parents will
be his or her "real" parents.33'
existence due to the mother's deceit, a custody hearing pursuant to the Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act is improper. Baby Richard 11, No. 78101, 1995 WL 80012,
at *11. Because the court found that the Does lacked standing under the Amended
Adoption Act, however, the court did not rule on the constitutionality of this provision.
Id. at *15-*16.
326. The best interests of the child standard is difficult to define. However, one
commentator proposes that:
a new perspective on generational justice that recognizes that meeting the
needs of children is the primary concern of family law, and justice towards the
next generation its motivating force .... Generism would place children, not
adults, firmly at the center and take as its central values not adult
individualism, possession, and autonomy, as embodied in parental rights, nor
even the dyadic intimacy of parent/child relationships. It would value most
highly concrete service to the needs of the next generation, in public and
private spheres, and encourage adult partnership and mutuality in the work of
family, as well as collective community responsibility for the well-being of
children.
Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 1814-15.
327. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
329. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, §§ 50/20, 50/20b.
330. For example, if the Baby Richard case had been fully adjudicated within six
months, few would have taken notice that an infant was being returned to his biological
father. This may well be the heart of the issue in the Baby Richard case, as Public
Guardian Patrick Murphy noted:
"We have a little boy who has lived his entire life with a phenomenal
couple. He's got an older brother he's bonded with. This is a family. To take
this kid out of the family will just tear this kid apart emotionally. It would just
be a horrible thing to do."
Edward Walsh, Controversial Illinois Adoption Ruling Upheld Without Comment,
Supreme Court Affirms Biological Father's Right to "Baby Richard," WASH. POST, Nov.
8, 1994, at A6 (quoting Illinois Public Guardian Patrick Murphy).
The bond between the adoptive parents and a six-month-old child arguably could be
more easily repaired when broken. See Korn, supra note 50, at 1327-28.
331. The child in these difficult cases functions essentially as chattel, waiting to see
who owns the right to raise the child. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 190 (I11. 1994)
(Heiple, J., writing in support of the denial of rehearing). Indeed, it may very well be
that a child who has lived with adoptive parents for six, three, or even one month has
established a bond which, if broken, will negatively impact on the child's development.
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Additionally, the Amended Adoption Act protects the child's
relationship with his or her biological parents. While many have sug-
gested that the psychological relationship established between a child
and a parent-figure is extremely important to the development of a
healthy child,332 the biological connection between a parent and a child
is also significant.333 Children's attempts to eventually seek out their
"real" or biological parents demonstrate the importance of this bio-
logical connection. By providing the unwed father with the ability
to ensure his right to notice and to consent in adoption proceedings
involving his child, the Amended Adoption Act protects the child's
relationship with a father who is willing to care and to provide for him
or her.335
D. Securing Adoptions
The Amended Adoption Act also provides the adoptive parents with
a sense of security and finality in the adoption process. By providing
more stringent and specific adoption procedures, the State of Illinois
successfully protects the adoptive parents from future collateral attacks
upon the custody of their adoptive children.336 For example, em-
See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 289. "Children, however, are not divisible, and
their interests suffer when they are~forced into a model that denies the reality that
parenting takes place not only between parent and child but also in mutuality and
support among adult care givers." Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 1812.
332. GOLDSTEIN ETAL., supra note 5, at 289.
333. The significance of this relationship has been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court:
[T]he usual understanding of "family" implies biological relationships, and
most decisions treating the relation between parent and child have stressed
this element .... It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843
(1977) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citations omitted).
334. One commentator explains:
The biological family is the source of identity for a child. Children feel part of
the biological family and its roots: they resemble their parents, possess some
personality traits of their parents, and have the family health problems. What
a child knows and imagines about the biological family helps to mold the
child's self-perception.
Beyer & Mylniec, supra note 7, at 237-38. Another commentator has noted that "the
child would benefit from developing a relationship with his biological father by
learning about his genetic heritage. There is a strong psychological need for people to
discover their biological identities and ancestries; this knowledge is essential for a full
understanding of who we are." Zinman, supra note 131, at 998.
335. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
336. The Amended Adoption Act significantly narrows the category of an unwed
father who retains the right to consent to the adoption of his child. Compare ILL. COMP.
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powering the unwed father with the ability to control his right to notice
protects an adoption from an unwed father who may not know the
mother has placed the child up for adoption.33 If the unwed father
registers, the adoptive parents can discover his identity and ensure that
he receives notice of the adoption regardless of whether the biological
mother reveals the unwed father's existence or identity.338 Indeed, had
the unwed father in the Baby Richard case registered with a putative
father registry, the Does could have discovered his existence regard-
less of the unwed mother's actions.339
Moreover, if an unwed father does not register with the Putative
Father Registry and does not fit within the limited classifications listed
in the Amended Adoption Act, he has not secured his right to notice of
the impending adoption.34 By placing the responsibility to secure this
notice with the unwed father, the adoptive parents can be sure that they
have done everything possible to discover his existence by checking
with the Registry.34'
V. PROPOSAL
Illinois' Amended Adoption Act provides protection for all parties in
adoption proceedings. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the Amended
Adoption Act remain vague, and the Illinois General Assembly must
amend it to specifically provide complete protection to unwed fathers,
their children, and adopting parents.
STAT. ANN. ch 750, § 50/8(b)(l)(B) to (c)(1)(B) (discussing when the consent of the
unwed father is required) with id. § 50/8 (West 1993) (amended 1994) (setting forth the
circumstances, prior to the Amended Adoption Act, when the consent of the unwed father
was required). See also supra notes 328-35 and accompanying text discussing other
significant changes which help protect adoptions from subsequent challenges.
337. For a discussion of how an unwed father may secure his right to notice by
registering with the Putative Father Registry, see supra notes 228-29 and accom-
panying text.
338. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/12.1 (West Supp. 1995). The amendments
specifically provide that "[a]n interested party, including persons intending to adopt a
child ... may request that the Department search the Registry to determine whether a
putative father is registered in relation to a child who is or may be the subject to an
adoption petition." Id.
339. Since the unwed father in the Baby Richard case suspected that his child had
been born alive, under the Amended Adoption Act, he could have registered with the
Putative Father Registry and ensured that the adoptive parents would be able to discover
his existence regardless of the biological mother's actions. See supra notes 169-83 and
accompanying text.
340. Bostick, supra note 163, at 657.
341. See supra part III.C (discussing the possibility that the statute provides the
unwed father with rights if he has taken steps to provide for the child but has not
registered with the Registry).
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First, adopting parents should be required, in all circumstances, to
search the Putative Father Registry, and should never be allowed to
rely solely on the mother's affidavit.34 2 For example, in cases where
the unwed mother lies about her knowledge of the unwed father's
identity, it seems clear that the adoptive parents should not be allowed
to rely solely on the affidavit provided by the mother.43 Furthermore,
notwithstanding the mother's affidavit, if the unwed father has at-
tempted to provide the unwed mother with financial assistance for the
birth and the support of the child, he has earned the right to consent to
the adoption.3" If he does not know that the mother has placed the
child for adoption and the adoptive parents do not check the Registry,
the unwed father's constitutionally--or at least statutorily-protected
interest in his relationship with his child will have been violated.
Thus, the Amended Adoption Act should be interpreted to require the
adoptive parents to search the Registry for every adoption in order to
adequately safeguard the unwed father's rights.
Second, if the unwed father fulfills his obligation, but has not
registered with the Putative Father Registry, the State has a duty to
ensure that those adopting the child attempt to provide the best notice
possible to the unwed father. 345 The adoptive parents should not be
relieved of the duty to notify the unwed father merely because his
name does not appear in the Registry.346 The statute should not
342. As written, the Act is unclear whether the adoptive parents must search the
Registry before proceeding without the unwed father in the adoption. Compare supra
note 230 (discussing the amendmet to § 50/11 which provides that the adoptive
parents may "rely upon a sworn statement of the biological mother ... identifying the
father of her child.") with supra note 232 (discussing how the Amended Adoption Act
also indicates that the adoptive parents may be required to search the registry if the
biological father has not consented to the adoption or waived his right to consent).
343. See supra notes 230, 342 (discussing the amendment to the Adoption Act which
purportedly allowed the adoptive parents to rely on the biological mother's sworn
statement).
344. See supra part III.C.
345. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/8 (providing the unwed father with a
statutory right to notice and to consent in an adoption of his child when he has fulfilled
certain requirements).
346. One of the co-authors of the statute stresses the goal of the Amended Adoption
Act:
To limit judicial discretion and thus prevent lengthy contested adoption
litigation, the legislation clearly states that "[it is in the best interests of
persons to be adopted that this Act be construed and interpreted so as to not
result in extending time limits beyond those set forth herein."
For example, if a putative father registers on the 30th day after the child's
birth, he has met the registration requirements of the Act. However, if he
registers on the 57th day after the child's birth, he has failed to meet his
burden regardless of other activities he may have undertaken and regardless of
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provide that in one instance the unwed father has established the right
to consent or to withhold consent to adoptions by attempting to pay for
the medical expenses involving his child, and in the next instance, state
that it will not notify him of the proceedings.347
Third, if an unwed father successfully contests an adoption of his
child by showing a sufficient interest in his child and by requesting
custody of his child, the Act must provide him with full parental rights
and not merely the opportunity to participate in a hearing to determine
the best interests of the child. The Illinois Supreme Court's holding in
Baby Richard II commands this result. 348 Moreover, if the unwed
father establishes a relationship with his child, he establishes a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in that relationship that cannot
be deprived by the Illinois General Assembly.349 If, however, the
unwed father successfully challenges an adoption petition-but does
not request custody of his child-a custody hearing determining the
best interests of the child would not violate the father's parental
rights.5
Finally, the Putative Father Registry must be adequately pub-
licized.35 ' The protection provided by the Registry is moot if the
whether the mother lied to him about the pregnancy.
Bostick, supra note 163, at 658 (emphasis added). Arguably, this is inconsistent with
other provisions of the Adoption Act because if the unwed father has attempted to
provide financial support for the child, his consent is required under § 50/8. ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch 750, § 50/8.
347. See id. § 50/8 (listing the requirements which must be met in order to gain the
right to consent to the adoption); compare with id. § 50/12.1 (providing that if an
unwed father does not register with the Putative Father Registry, he will not secure his
right to notice). While § 50/12.1(i) of the Amended Adoption Act suggests that the
adoptive parents must show that the biological father either waived his rights or
consented to the adoption in order to avoid searching the Registry, it remains unclear
what such a showing actually entails. Id. § 50/12.1(i). Arguably, the adoptive parents
could simply claim, vis-a-vis the testimony of the mother, that the biological father had
abandoned the child and, therefore, could establish waiver. See id. § 50/1(D) (West
1993) (amended 1994) (listing the grounds for a finding of parental unfitness).
348. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 94-141 and accompanying text.
350. In a custody hearing, the biological parents' parental rights to the child are not
necessarily terminated. See supra note 143.
351. At least one commentator has noted the significance of publicizing the
availability of putative father registries:
In order for a putative fathers' registry to be successful, its availability must
be publicized. Some of the states that have registries provide for funding and
statewide distribution of information as to the registry's existence, its
purpose, procedures on how to register, and most importantly, the
consequences of failure to register. Although lack of knowledge of the
registry is not a valid defense to a putative father's failure to register,
extensive publicity of a newly created registry would be appropriate to educate
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unwed father does not realize he has an option. While some fathers
will seek legal assistance within the statutorily mandated limits, many
may not, simply because they are unaware of the Registry's existence.
While ignorance of the law is no excuse, the law cannot serve its pur-
pose without the unwed father's knowledge of its existence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The interests at stake in contested adoption proceedings are sub-
stantial. Adoptive parents require the security of knowing that their
child will not be taken away from them years after they have adopted
the child. The biological parents require protection from the State and
third parties when proceedings involve the termination of their parental
rights.
Perhaps most importantly, the innocent child requires protection
from an unstable living arrangement, which could cause significant
emotional harm to that child. Adoption laws must attempt to protect
adequately and to balance these sometimes competing interests, and
must be specific and comprehensive enough to succeed. Illinois'
Amended Adoption Act, while in need of some revision, successfully
balances these competing adoption interests.
SUSAN SWINGLE
putative fathers about the registry and its function.
Dapolito, supra note 7, at 1025-26.
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